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JOINT WINNERS, SEPARATE LOSERS:
PROPOSALS TO EASE THE STING FOR MARRIED TAXPAYERS FILING
SEPARATELY
by
Michelle Lyon Drumbl*
ABSTRACT
A taxpayer who is “considered as married” according to the
Internal Revenue Code’s definition must file either a joint income tax return
or an individual return using the “married filing separately” filing status.
Those married taxpayers who file a separate, rather than a joint, income tax
return are denied valuable benefits and subjected to a host of other
unfavorable limitations. Low-income taxpayers, in particular, are hurt by
these limitations. Certain married taxpayers, including victims of domestic
violence and abandoned spouses, may have no choice but to file using the
married filing separately status. Low-income taxpayers are denied
tremendous benefits, such as the earned income tax credit, as they begin to
rebuild their lives.
Perhaps intentionally because of these limitations, and in other
cases perhaps unintentionally by misunderstanding or mistake, some
taxpayers incorrectly choose single or head of household as their filing
status when the correct status should have been married filing separately. In
the context of the earned income tax credit, the cost to the government of this
particular type of filing status error is estimated to be between $2.3 and $3.3
billion annually. As currently structured, not unsurprisingly, the limitations
on the married filing separately filing status create an incentive for this type
of taxpayer or return preparer noncompliance.
Further complicating this filing status frustration, the Code imposes
limitations on how and when married taxpayers may amend their return to
file a joint return after one or both spouses files a separate return. The
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Internal Revenue Service applies a restrictive reading of these limitations;
whether the Service is interpreting the Code correctly remains an open
question in the courts.
This Article explores these married taxpayer filing status limitations
and the collateral consequences thereof. It briefly outlines how and why the
joint filing option developed and touches upon the concepts of the marriage
bonus and the marriage penalty. It concludes by proposing three alternative
models to the current limitations imposed on married taxpayers who choose
to (or have no choice but to) file separate returns. In each proposal, lowincome taxpayers would have increased access to the credits meant to assist
them. In addition to increasing fairness, each proposal would reduce or
remove a structural incentive for taxpayer noncompliance.
I.
II.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Married couples can elect to file a joint income tax return, and most
do. But those who do not, or cannot, file jointly often face adverse tax
consequences. Taxpayers who file using the married filing separate filing
status are denied certain significant deductions and credits available to all
other types of filers.1 Certain other credits and deductions are allowed to
married filing separately taxpayers, but only under a narrowly defined set of
circumstances.2 Certain items of income that would be excludible on a joint
return must be included in income on a married filing separately return.3 A
1.
An Internal Revenue Service (Service) publication provides a list of
these, noting “you usually pay more tax on a separate return than if you use another
filing status you qualify for.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 501,
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 7 (2015). Use of
the married filing separate status precludes a taxpayer from taking the EITC, the
American opportunity credit, and the lifetime learning credit. I.R.C. §§ 25A, 32(d). It
additionally precludes a taxpayer from claiming deductions for student loan interest
and qualified tuition. I.R.C. §§ 221(e)(2), 222(d)(4).
2.
The premium tax credit is a recent and elaborate example of this, and I
address it in detail in Part II.B. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C). Other credits have special
rules that differ from the Code’s general definition of who is “considered as
married.” For example, the credit for the elderly and disabled is allowed to a
taxpayer filing married separately “in the case of a husband and wife who live apart
at all times during the taxable year.” I.R.C. § 22(e)(1). The child and dependent care
credit is allowed to a separate filer only if the spouse did not live with the taxpayer
for the last 6 months of the taxable year and the taxpayer maintains a household for
more than one-half of the year for a “qualifying person” (as defined in I.R.C.
§ 21(b)(1)), which is a slightly relaxed version of the definition of a dependent;
taxpayers in some circumstances may meet this definition while failing to meet the
head of household requirements. I.R.C. § 21(e)(2). Similarly, the adoption tax credit
is allowed provided that the spouse did not live in the home for the last six months of
the year, and the taxpayer maintains a household for more than one-half of the year
for the “eligible child” (as defined in I.R.C. § 23(d)(2)). I.R.C. § 23(f)(1).
3.
A married taxpayer filing separately cannot exclude interest income
from the redemption of qualified U.S. savings bonds used to pay for higher
education expenses, while taxpayers in all other filing statuses can exclude such
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married taxpayer who files separately cannot claim the standard deduction
(which would be one-half that allowed on a joint return) if the taxpayer’s
spouse itemizes on his or her return.4
Low-income taxpayers, in particular, are adversely impacted by
these rules.5 Of perhaps greatest significance, a married taxpayer who
chooses to (or is forced to) file separately becomes instantly ineligible for the
earned income tax credit (“EITC”), even if he or she meets all other
eligibility provisions.6 A married taxpayer filing separately can claim the
premium tax credit or the child and dependent care expense credit only if
narrow and cumbersome exceptions are met.7 Each of these three credits
plays an important safety net function for low-income taxpayers; due to life’s
complexities and the (sometimes greater) complexities of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), taxpayers who must file separately may be shut out of
these credits despite sympathetic circumstances.
Perhaps in part for these reasons, some taxpayers deliberately
misrepresent their marital status, choosing single or head of household filing
status despite not meeting the required criteria for those statuses. In other
cases, taxpayers are led astray by an incompetent or (more likely)
unscrupulous tax return preparer who selects the incorrect filing status,
perhaps doing so without the taxpayer’s knowledge or understanding. As
currently structured, the disadvantages associated with the married filing
separate status create an incentive for this type of taxpayer or preparer
noncompliance. Further complicating this issue, the Code imposes
limitations on how and when married taxpayers may amend their filing to
file jointly after one or both spouses has filed a separate return. The Internal
Revenue Service (Service) applies a restrictive reading of these limitations;
income up to certain limitations. I.R.C. § 135(d)(3). Likewise, other filers who have
social security benefits can exclude part or all of the benefits from income according
to a “base amount,” but a married taxpayer filing separately is not entitled to any
base amount that may be excluded so long as he or she lived with his or her spouse
at any time during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 86(c)(1)(C).
4.
I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(A).
5.
Another disadvantage of married filing separately that is often cited is
that the tax rate table income bands are overall narrower than those for an unmarried
person. However, in tax year 2014, this rate difference only came into effect once the
filer’s taxable income exceeded $74,425. Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537.
While this is surely an additional disincentive for certain taxpayers filing separately,
this particularity is outside of the scope of this Article because it does not concern
low-income taxpayers.
6.
I.R.C. § 32(d).
7.
I.R.C. §§ 21(e)(2), 36B(c)(1)(C).

Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf 10

12/21/2016 6:16:42 PM

2016]

Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately

404

whether the Service is interpreting the Code correctly remains an open
question.8
Curiously, not all income-based credits and deductions are denied to
a taxpayer who files a married filing separate return. For example, such a
taxpayer can still benefit from the child tax credit and the retirement savings
contributions credit.9 While the income threshold for the phase-out of these
two credits is reduced for a married individual filing separately as compared
to married individuals filing a joint return,10 this treatment is obviously more
favorable than an outright denial of eligibility.11 The retirement savings
contributions credit (sometimes called the “saver’s credit”) is designed
specifically to benefit low-income taxpayers, in that it has income thresholds
somewhat similar to the EITC.12 The child tax credit, in contrast, is available
to low-income taxpayers but also at income levels for certain filers that are
decidedly not “low-income.”13

8.
See infra Part III.D (discussing the recent Eighth Circuit opinion in
Ibrahim v. Commissioner).
9.
I.R.C. §§ 24, 25B.
10.
In the case of the child tax credit, the threshold amounts are as
follows: $110,000 for a joint return; $75,000 for an unmarried individual; and
$55,000 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return. I.R.C. § 24(b)(2). In the case
of the retirement savings contributions credit, the income thresholds and applicable
credit percentages are the same for an unmarried taxpayer and a married taxpayer
who files separately (and double these figures for joint filers). I.R.C. § 25B(b).
11.
In a similar vein, I.R.C. § 121 permits married taxpayers filing
separately to exclude the gain from the sale of a principal residence, but the
provision halves the amount that can be excluded by each spouse to $250,000 (as
compared to $500,000 for joint filers). Likewise, a married taxpayer filing separately
is allowed a capital loss deduction of $1,500 (as compared to $3,000 for joint filers).
12.
For an unmarried taxpayer or a married taxpayer filing separately in
2014, the saver’s credit fully phased out at $30,000, while the EITC for an unmarried
taxpayer with three children fully phased out at $46,997. For a married couple filing
jointly in 2014, the saver’s credit fully phased out at $60,000, whereas a married
couple with three or more children is phased out of the EITC at $52,427. Notice
2013–73, 2013–49 I.R.B. 598; Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537.
13.
As noted supra in footnote 10, on a joint return the child tax credit
begins to gradually phase out at an adjusted gross income of $110,000. This is more
than double the adjusted gross income at which the EITC is fully phased out on a
joint return (as noted supra in footnote 12, in tax year 2014 this figure was $52,427
for a married couple with three or more children). For a comparison and critique of
the differences between the EITC and the child tax credit, see Dorothy A. Brown,
The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755 (2005).
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This Article will explore some of the problems that arise from the
Code’s limitations on choosing a filing status, the collateral consequences of
that status, and the limitations on changing that status after filing. In
particular, this Article is concerned with low-income taxpayers, as this is the
most economically vulnerable population and the one that is hurt
disproportionately by these limitations. Part III addresses the ways in which
these limitations play a role in taxpayer and preparer noncompliance,
contributing to the size of the much-criticized “improper payment” rate of
the EITC.14 According to a Service study of returns filed for tax years 20062008, an estimated five percent of all EITC claimants (constituting
approximately one million returns) incorrectly chose single or (more
commonly) head of household status when the correct status should have
been married filing separately.15 The cost to the government of this specific

14.
In 2014, the estimated error rate on EITC payments was 27.2%,
representing an estimated $17.7 billion in improper payments. Government
Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap,
Duplication, and Improper Payments and Achieve Other Financial Benefits:
Testimony of U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO–15–440T) Before the S. Comm.
on the Budget, 114th Cong. 35 (2015) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller
General of the United States). As a percentage of outlays, the EITC improper
payment rate is by far the highest of any government spending program. The error
rate has been high for more than a decade, and despite a high examination rate of
EITC returns, the Service has not been able to reduce the error rate. A recent Service
compliance study concludes that the two most common causes of EITC overclaims
are income misreporting and qualifying child errors. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. NO. 5162 (8-2014), COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT CLAIMED ON 2006–2008 RETURNS 20 [hereinafter COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES].
The study indicates that filing status errors are the third most common source of
error (and a distant third to the first two causes), accounting for an estimated 9 to
17% of overclaims. Not all filing status errors arise from married taxpayers filing as
single or head of household; another common filing status error is when an
unmarried taxpayer erroneously chooses head of household to claim qualifying
children of his or her significant other (i.e. dependents who are not his or her child or
stepchild).
15.
COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 20. This report explains:
“Five percent of all EITC claimants (two percent of those filing single and nine
percent of those filing as head-of-household) are estimated to have the correct status
of married-filing-separately, making them ineligible for the credit.” Id. I discuss the
significance of this statistic in Part III.D, infra.
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type of overclaiming is estimated to be between $2.3 and $3.3 billion
annually.16
Part IV of this Article outlines in brief how and why the joint filing
option developed and touches upon the concepts of the marriage bonus and
the marriage penalty. For a variety of reasons, some scholars have argued in
favor of eliminating joint filing and adopting a system of individual filing for
all. While this author favors such an approach,17 I believe it unlikely that
Congress will abolish the joint filing option or radically overhaul the current
filing status structure.
This Article concludes in Part V by proposing three alternative
models to the current limitations imposed on married taxpayers who choose
to (or have no choice but to) file separately. In each proposal, low-income
taxpayers would have increased access to the credits meant to assist them. In
addition to increasing fairness, each proposal also would reduce or remove a
structural incentive for taxpayer noncompliance.
The first proposal I describe builds upon a current provision
applicable only to certain separate filers who claim the premium tax credit,
which is the refundable advance credit available to taxpayers who apply for
health coverage through the Health Insurance Marketplace.18
The second proposal draws from the example of the Canadian revenue
system, which provides individual filing for all taxpayers (with no option to
file jointly) but bases eligibility for a family tax credit on household (rather
than individual) income. This proposal will show that with information
sharing between returns, Congress can keep the two “married” filing statuses
in place but could base all credit eligibility on household income. Thus, a
married woman who lives with her husband but files separately would be
entitled to the EITC provided that her husband’s income is also sufficiently
low as to meet the thresholds that apply to joint filers. In contrast, a married
16.
COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 19 tbl.5. The estimates
used in Table 5 of the Service’s Compliance Estimates report treat each different
EITC overclaim error type in isolation. To provide context to these figures: the
report averages “returns filed for TY 2006–2008, [and estimates that during that
period] 23.7 million taxpayers claimed an annual total of $49.3 billion in EITC.” Id.
at iv.
17.
For my critique of joint and several liability and my argument for
individual filing in light of the changing demographics of the United States, see
Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence and
Income Splitting, 4 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 94 (2012).
18.
For information about the Healthcare Marketplace and the premium
tax credit, see generally 2015 Health Coverage & Your Federal Taxes,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/taxes/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
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woman who lives separately from her estranged husband would be entitled to
the EITC based on her own income. At the same time, this proposal calls for
unmarried cohabitating parents to be subjected to the EITC phase-outs based
on their combined household income rather than their filing status. As I
address in the discussion of this proposal, unmarried cohabitating parents (of
all income levels, including low-income) are in many cases tax-favored
compared to married couples.19 In this regard, the current Code creates a
potential economic disincentive for couples of various income levels to
marry.20 My proposal would not fully correct this disparity, but at least it
would relieve some of the more egregious examples of inequity faced by
married taxpayers. This proposal thus would make the married filing
separately status less punitive in nature, while accomplishing the same
legislative purposes of the income thresholds and preserving the EITC as an
anti-poverty measure.
My third proposal envisions a filing procedure more like the status
quo U.S. system, but with the significant departure that credits and
deductions claimed on a married filing separate return would be allowed at
half the amount permitted to an unmarried taxpayer. In this proposal, a
married woman who files separately and is a low-earner would be entitled to
receive half the EITC amount to which an unmarried taxpayer with the same
individual income is entitled. My proposal allows this even if the married
taxpayer’s husband’s income is sufficiently high that their combined income
would make them ineligible for the EITC if they filed jointly. While in this
case, the wife would benefit from filing separately with her low income, the
husband simultaneously loses the benefit of income splitting and the more
favorable rate brackets. At lower household income levels, this proposal
sometimes would result in a married couple reaping a collective benefit from
filing separately. Once the household income reaches a higher threshold,
married taxpayers generally still would fare better by filing a joint return.
This proposal would make the married filing separately status less punitive in
nature, and may also create an incentive for both spouses to work, especially
at the margins of the EITC income phase-out. The advantage of such an
incentive is discussed in Part V.C.
19.
See Drumbl, supra note 17, at 121.
20.
See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The
Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297 (1999) (finding that the
existence of a ‘marriage tax’ discourages marriage, especially for women, although
its effect is generally small); James Alm, M. V. Lee Badgett & Leslie A.
Whittington, Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of Legalizing
Same-Sex Marriage, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 201, 213 (2000) (“it seems unlikely that taxes
are the main, or even a major, factor in the marriage decision for most couples”).
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II. HOW FILING SEPARATELY DISADVANTAGES TAXPAYERS, AND WHY
SOME TAXPAYERS CANNOT AVOID IT
A “married individual” can elect to file a single joint return with his
or her spouse, even if one of the spouses is not required to file a return.21 If
the election to file jointly is not made, a married individual must file using
“married filing separate” status.22 Marital status is determined as of the last
date of the taxable year.23
The Code provides three exceptions for when a married individual
“shall not be considered as married” for purposes of determining filing
status: 1) “an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance”;24 2) a taxpayer who maintains and
furnishes more than one-half the cost for a household which for more than
one-half the taxable year is the principal place of abode of the taxpayer’s
child, provided that the taxpayer’s spouse was not a member of that
household during the last six months of the taxable year;25 and 3) a taxpayer
whose spouse at any time during the year was a nonresident alien, provided
that the taxpayer qualifies for head of household status.26
21.
I.R.C. § 6013(a) (stating that joint filing is an option “even though one
of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions”).
22.
Spouses domiciled in one of the nine community property states who
file separate returns are subject to special rules; they must each report one half of the
community income in addition to their separate income. I.R.C. § 66. This Article
does not attempt to address the differences and the complexities that arise in
community property states.
23.
I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1).
24.
I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2).
25.
I.R.C. § 7703(b). For this purpose, the spouse is considered to live in
the home if he or she is “temporarily absent from the household due to special
circumstances.” Reg. § 1.7703–1(b)(5). “Special circumstances” may include illness,
education, business, vacation, or military service. Id. Note also that the rule in
section 7703(b) is more restrictive than the head of household requirement insofar as
the taxpayer must be entitled to claim a child as a dependent; for this purpose, the
meaning of child is defined in section 152(f)(1), which includes a son, daughter,
stepchild, adopted child, or eligible foster child. This is in contrast to section 2(b),
which provides that an unmarried taxpayer using the head of household status must
be entitled to claim as a dependent a “qualifying child” as defined in section 152(c),
which is more expansive in that it includes siblings, nieces, nephews, and
grandchildren.
26.
I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(B). This presumes that the couple did not elect under
section 6013(g) to treat the nonresident alien spouse as a U.S. resident for tax
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A. With All the Disadvantages, Why Would Anyone Elect Married Filing
Separate Status?
In the tax year 2012, the Service received 2,663,017 returns of
married persons filing separately.27 Perhaps a small percentage of these
taxpayers as couples benefitted from a collectively lower liability due to the
unusual nature of their situation.28 Far more likely, the couple collectively
paid more tax but had a compelling nontax reason to make this election, such
as a desire to keep finances separate or to avoid joint and several liability. 29
But for many taxpayers, choosing this status is not so much an “election” as
the absence of other viable alternatives. These taxpayers are the primary
purposes. Note that the spouse is not a qualifying person for purposes of determining
head of household status; there must be another qualifying dependent in the
household. I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i).
27.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS 2012, at 77 tbl.1.6 (2014).
28.
The oft-cited example of when a married couple may benefit from
separate returns is when one spouse has a low income and also significant deductions
that are subject to an adjusted gross income (AGI) floor. For example, section 213
provides that certain medical expenses are deductible (as an itemized deduction) to
the extent the expenses exceed 10% of the taxpayer’s AGI. On a joint return, the
couple’s AGI would be the floor for calculating the deduction. On a separate return,
the individual taxpayer’s AGI would be used; thus, if both spouses had income, a
greater portion of the expense would exceed the floor. Of course, it is not a foregone
conclusion that the taxpayers would collectively benefit from this. There are many
other factors in computing the respective liabilities, so the benefit of the higher
medical expense deduction may be offset by any number of things, including a
collectively less preferential rate structure, the missed opportunity for income
splitting, and the fact that both spouses must itemize if one spouse does so.
29.
Another compelling nontax reason is if one spouse has student loans
with income based repayment (IBR). Under current law, if married spouses file
separately, the repayment is based on separate income (whereas it is based on joint
income for joint filers). See Peter J. Reilly, Something Borrowed Makes You Blue—
Student Debt and Joint Returns, FORBES.COM, (July 5, 2015, 2:31 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/07/05/something-borrowed-makesyou-blue-student-debt-and-joint-returns/. See also Victoria J. Haneman, The
Collision of Student Loan Debt and Joint Marital Taxation, 35 VA. TAX REV. 223,
227 (2016) (arguing that “allowing a married borrower to qualify for PAYE/IBR and
loan forgiveness on the basis of a separately filed tax return is problematic” due to
the other disadvantages of the married filing separately status and describing how
female borrowers suffer a twofold penalty due to the gender pay gap and secondary
earner bias).
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concern of this Article, and the following section describes different
categories of taxpayers who are “considered as married” (under the Code
definition set forth above) but lack viable alternatives at filing time.
1. Separated, but Not Legally So
A married taxpayer who is living apart from his or her spouse but not
legally separated is not able to file as single.30 He or she might be eligible to
file using head of household status, but only if he or she meets the
requirements for that status and additionally meets one of the two exceptions
described above.31 For example, a taxpayer who has been living apart from
his or her spouse (and is not legally separated) for less than the last six
months of the tax year cannot use the head or household status because he or
she does not meet the criteria in order to “not be considered as married” for
purposes of section 7703(b). For a parent living with children, this is a costly
restriction. And even in cases in which one spouse does meet the definition
to “not be considered as married” because the children live with him or her
and the other requirements are met, the other spouse does not benefit; the
noncustodial spouse is still considered to be married (absent a legal
separation) and must file a separate return.
For low-income taxpayers, in particular, the cost or lack of access to legal
assistance may make a court-ordered separation and subsequent divorce
prohibitive. For this and many other reasons, some couples (at all income
levels) part ways without completing this legal formality and remain
married.32
Unless they meet the Code’s criteria to be considered
unmarried, these taxpayers are legally required to file as married filing
separately, and a return preparer is ethically bound to use that status if the
30.
The Code contains a special provision for a married taxpayer whose
spouse is in “missing status” due to service in a combat zone; these taxpayers can
elect to file a joint return under a very narrowly defined set of circumstances. I.R.C.
§ 6013(f).
31.
I.R.C. §§ 7703(b), 2(b)(2)(B); supra note 25 and accompanying text.
32.
See, e.g., Pamela Paul, The Un-Divorced, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/fashion/01Undivorced.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=1 (citing several scenarios of couples who split up but do not divorce, and noting
that such couples are “irrefutably bound by contractual links on issues like taxes”).
See also Tumin et al., Estimates and Meanings of Marital Separation,77 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 312, 313 (2015) (noting that for some couples “marital
separation may become an alternative to divorce, lasting for many years without
resolving in either divorce or reconciliation”).
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taxpayer discloses this detail. The Code does not provide any exception or
safe harbor for these taxpayers, though they may conceptualize themselves as
unmarried and certainly are no longer in a financial partnership with their
legal spouse.
2. Spouse Refuses to Sign; Spousal Abuse
Among its other ills, domestic violence creates terrible dilemmas for
taxpayers. Spousal abuse can include physical abuse as well as control,
intimidation, and forms of emotional manipulation. Women or men suffering
in such a relationship dynamic may be forced by an abusive spouse to sign a
joint return against their better judgment. In such cases, the abused spouse
later may be eligible for relief from joint liability by making a request for
innocent spouse relief.33
Conversely, the abusive partner may refuse to provide financial
information or participate in the filing process with his or her spouse, leaving
the abused taxpayer with no recourse but to file a separate return. In other
cases, victims of domestic violence may have fled the relationship yet remain
legally married, and in such cases, they do not wish to contact the spouse to
coordinate a joint return.34
In recognition of these circumstances, the Treasury promulgated regulations
to provide a special exception to victims of spousal abuse who claim the
premium tax credit but must (or choose to) file a separate return. As detailed
in Part II.B.2, this exception is a relatively recent and extremely important
development for domestic violence victims, but it is limited only to the
premium tax credit. This exception serves as the model for one of the
proposals set forth in Part V.35

33.
See generally I.R.C. § 6015.
34.
See, e.g., Letter from Futures Without Violence to the Internal
Revenue Service 1 (October 27, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=I
RS-2014-0025-0015 (stating “Many domestic violence victims remain legally
married even after they have fled their abusive relationship. Their spouse may not
grant a divorce; they may be too afraid to ask for a divorce; or not enough time may
have passed to be granted a divorce”).
35.
See also Mary Leto Pareja, Beyond the Affordable Care Act’s
Premium Tax Credit: Ensuring Access to Safety Net Programs, 38 HAMLINE L. REV.
241, 284 (2015) (describing the premium tax credit’s exceptions and arguing that
such an exception should be expanded to allow domestic violence victims to claim
other benefits, including the EITC, that are typically lost by filing separately).
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3. Spousal Abandonment
A married taxpayer who was abandoned by his or her spouse is still
“considered as married” if he or she: 1) was abandoned within the last six
months of the tax year (even if the taxpayer heads a separate household with
his or her children); or 2) does not have dependent children. Yet, a taxpayer
obviously cannot elect to file a joint return with someone who is absent and
uncooperative and, thus, is forced to file a married filing separate return.
In response to comments it received following the proposed regulations
creating a spousal abuse exception for taxpayers filing separately and
claiming the premium tax credit, the Treasury expanded the exception to
include spouses who have been abandoned and cannot locate their spouse.
Again, this exception is significant in that it recognizes a category of
taxpayer that has no option to file jointly; but as with victims of spousal
abuse, the exception is limited to the premium tax credit.
4. U.S. Person Married to Nonresident Alien, If Head of Household
Status Is Not Available and No Election Is Made Under 6013(g)
Section 6013(a)(1) provides that a joint return cannot be made if one
of the spouses is a nonresident alien. The U.S. resident spouse is allowed to
file using head of household status if he or she otherwise qualifies for it.36
This is true despite the fact that the spouses live in the household together;
this rule represents a beneficial exception not available to two U.S. resident
spouses.
Section 6013(g) provides the opportunity for an election to treat the
nonresident spouse as a U.S. resident for tax purposes. Such an election
would make the nonresident spouse subject to U.S. taxation of his or her
worldwide income regardless of source, and it generally would preclude the
nonresident from electing benefits under a U.S. income tax treaty. As such
this may be a very undesirable election for some families.37

36.
I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(B); see supra note 26.
37.
The possible scenarios and the tax consequences of making the
election to be treated as a U.S. resident are varied and full of nuance. A full
discussion of this category, and of the differences in the taxation of resident and
nonresident aliens, is outside the scope of this Article. That said, the statutory
distinction made with respect to filing status and these couples is worth bearing in
mind.
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Absent the election, and without a dependent in the household that would
qualify the taxpayer for head of household filing status, the U.S. resident
spouse has no choice but to file married filing separately.
5. Lack of Access to Tax Advice; Lack of Planning; Misinformed
Decision Making
Many low-income taxpayers are unsophisticated and lack formal
education in financial matters. Many rely on friends or family for tax advice,
and this advice is often ill-informed even if well-intended. Not all taxpayers
speak English or can read it well enough to understand how to navigate the
instructions on an income tax return.
Some of these taxpayers choose to self-prepare their taxes due to the
cost of professional tax return preparation. Some of these taxpayers let a
friend or family member prepare the return on their behalf. Others rely on
questionable return preparers and lack the tools to understand, or the
confidence to challenge, what the return preparer presents for signature. The
low-cost tax preparation industry is replete with misinformation, preparer
fraud, and questionable advice.38 Thus, low-income taxpayers may not fully
appreciate what is at stake for them or be aware of the consequences of filing
incorrectly or inconsistently.
Many tax provisions available to low-income taxpayers are complex,
and generally these taxpayers lack access to reliable tax advice. While free
income tax return preparation is available at Service-sponsored sites such as
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the
Elderly (TCE), a surprisingly small percentage of taxpayers take advantage
of these valuable resources.39
As Part III will discuss in detail, taxpayers who lack (or do not seek)
access to informed and competent tax advice may make ill-informed
decisions as to filing status. Once the decision is made, the Code places
limitations on the ability for these taxpayers to later change their filing status
to married filing jointly.

38.
See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RIDDLED RETURNS:
HOW ERRORS AND FRAUD BY PAID TAX PREPARERS PUT CONSUMERS AT RISK AND
WHAT STATES CAN DO (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/reportriddled-returns.pdf.
39.
An estimated three percent of EITC returns are prepared by Servicesponsored return preparation sites. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 25
tbl.8.
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6. Mutual Fear of Joint Liability, Lack of Trust, or Preference to Keep
Things Separate
Some married couples live together but choose to keep finances—
and tax filings—separate. This preference may be for any number of reasons,
ranging from a deep individual sense of independence, to a lack of trust, to a
deliberate and rational choice to avoid joint liabilities.40 Unlike the other
categories I describe, couples in this scenario are truly making an election
and do not evoke the same sympathies as married taxpayers who have no
choice but to file separately. It is worth considering, however, whether the
current rules are too punitive for this category of taxpayers as well. My third
proposal, set forth in Part V, is broad enough to benefit certain taxpayers in
this category; I argue there are compelling policy reasons to allow such a
benefit.
B. How Are Low-Income Individuals in Particular Impacted by the
Limitations on the Separate Filing Status?
The introduction describes a number of credits and deductions that
are denied to married taxpayers who file separately. This Section discusses
three of these Code provisions in greater detail: the EITC; the premium tax
credit; and the special rules regarding itemized deductions for married filing
separate filers.
The EITC is the most financially significant to low-income
taxpayers, as it is a refundable credit designed to serve as an anti-poverty
program. The premium tax credit is a relatively new refundable credit
designed to assist lower-income taxpayers who buy health insurance through
the Affordable Care Act’s marketplace. It merits special attention in this
Article because Congress made it unavailable to married persons filing
separately, and the Treasury and Service have given great thought to creating
appropriate exceptions to this rule. The provision requiring married
40.
Another dynamic that may fall in this category is a couple that
remains married and continues to live together but that no longer has a romantic
partnership. One reason such couples remain in a household together is that it is “too
expensive to divorce”; the individuals wish to continue sharing expenses, but they
function more as roommates rather than a true economic unit. These couples may
benefit financially from joint filing, but by making that election they must take on
joint and several liability. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Marriage Economy: “I
Couldn’t Afford to Get Divorced,” NPR (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:29 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/20/144021297/marriage-economy-i-couldnt-afford-toget-divorced.
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taxpayers filing separately to itemize if their spouse itemizes can pose
challenges to filers who are estranged from their spouse; this impacts all
separate filers, but can have a harsh financial impact on low-income filers,
who are less likely to have a significant amount in itemized deductions.
1. Earned Income Tax Credit
The predecessor to today’s EITC was enacted as a temporary
program in 1975.41 Made permanent in 1978,42 Congress has expanded the
credit several times since then.43 In scope and size, it has grown into one of
the most significant federal anti-poverty benefit programs in the United
States.44 The legislative history describes the early proposals of the credit as
having two objectives: (1) “as a way of decreasing work disincentives” for
persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the regressive nature of
social security taxes.45 The maximum EITC available in 1975 was $400, and
41.
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209(b), 89 Stat. 26,
35. While this is commonly referred to as the birth of the EITC, I learned from
Bryan Camp that there was a refundable version of the earned income tax credit in
the mid-1920s.
42.
The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, § 103(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2771.
43.
For a summary of the legislative history of the EITC, see CHRISTINE
SCOTT & MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31768, THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): AN OVERVIEW app. A (2014). The EITC has
been amended and expanded several times, most notably by the following
legislation: The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 11111, 104 Stat. 1388,1408 (expanding the credit for families with two or more
qualifying children); The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, §13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433 (raising credit amounts and expanding EITC to
include a modest credit for childless workers); The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §1002, 123 Stat. 115, 312
(temporarily expanding the credit to allow a taxpayer to claim three or more
qualifying children); The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114113, § 103 129 Stat. 2242, 3044 (making permanent the expansion to three or more
qualifying children and the increased income phase-out for married taxpayers filing
jointly).
44.
SCOTT & CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 43, at 17 (citing KAREN
SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41625, FEDERAL BENEFITS AND SERVICES FOR
PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME: PROGRAMS, POLICY, AND SPENDING, FY2008–FY2009
(2011)).
45.
JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 94TH CONG., JCS-8-75,
ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 (H.R.
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it was available only to low-income taxpayers (both unmarried and married)
with a dependent child in their household.46 The credit began to phase out if
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeded $4,000, and a taxpayer with
an adjusted gross income of $8,000 or more would receive no credit at all.
As is still the case today, the credit as originally introduced was available to
a married couple only if a joint return was filed; a couple filing separately
could not receive the credit.47
Why prevent a married couple filing separately from receiving the
credit? Most likely, Congress wanted to keep the credit simple to administer
and ensure that a married couple did not unduly benefit. The House
Committee on Ways and Means report provided:
The credit is to be calculated on a return-by-return basis. Individuals
who are married and filing a joint return are eligible for only one
credit on the combined income of both individuals. Married
individuals filing separate returns are not eligible for the credit. A
married individual who is treated as not being married (under sec.
143(b)) for return-filing purposes (i.e., a head of a household whose
spouse has not been a member of the household for the entire year) is
eligible for the credit in the same manner as a single individual (and
any of the absent spouse's income attributed to him under State
community property laws is to be disregarded).48

2166) AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 33 (1975). See also S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 11
(1975) (elaborating on the EITC as follows: “This new refundable credit will provide
relief to families who currently pay little or no income tax. These people have been
hurt the most by rising food and energy costs. Also, in almost all cases, they are
subject to the social security payroll tax on their earnings. Because it will increase
their after-tax earnings, the new credit, in effect, provides an added bonus or
incentive for low-income people to work, and therefore, should be of importance in
inducing individuals with families receiving Federal assistance to support
themselves. Moreover, the refundable credit is expected to be effective in stimulating
the economy because the low-income people are expected to spend a large fraction
of their increased disposable incomes.”).
46.
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30.
As originally enacted, it appeared in § 43 of the Code. The EITC is currently found
in I.R.C. § 32.
47.
I.R.C. § 43(d) (1975).
48.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 30–31 (1975). Senate Report 94-36 contains
nearly identical language with no further elaboration. S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 35.
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As mentioned in the introduction, the child tax credit does not have
such a restriction—married filing separate filers can claim it, and the income
phase-out for those filers is one-half the amount allowed to joint filers.49
While the married filing separate phase-out is set at a lower income than the
phase-out set for unmarried filers, this rule makes far more sense than does
denying the credit based on filing status. There is no compelling
administrative reason for the Code to deny the EITC to married filing
separate filers while allowing those same filers another refundable credit that
is also subject to income limitations.
Currently, the EITC is most significant to taxpayers with children;
the benefit is far less valuable for taxpayers without a qualifying child.50 In
2014, the maximum EITC available to a taxpayer with no qualifying child
was $496 (in contrast to the maximum of $6,143 available to a taxpayer with
three or more qualifying children). The $496 maximum begins to phase out
at an adjusted gross income exceeding $8,150 (or $13,550 in the case of a
joint return), and phases out completely once the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income reaches $14,590 (or $20,020 in the case of a joint return). Notably,
however, there have been recent proposals from both Republicans and
Democrats to increase the EITC amount available to taxpayers without
qualifying children.51 If this legislation were to pass, the need to adopt a
proposal for relief for these married taxpayers who live apart and file
separately will be even more compelling.

49.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
50.
“Qualifying child” is defined in I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) to include
children, stepchildren, siblings, stepsiblings, and descendants of any of the above.
51.
These include a proposal in President Obama’s FY 2015 budget;
Congressman Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) Expanding Opportunity in America proposed
doubling the maximum credit, phase-in, and phase-out rates for childless adults; and
proposals from several Democrats including Senators Brown (D-OH), Durbin (DIL), and Murray (D-WA), Congressman Neal (D-MA), and Congressman Rangel (DNY). See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, THE PRESIDENT’S
PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report_0.pdf;
Expanding
Opportunity in America: Discussion Draft from the House Budget Comm., 113th
Cong. 24–29 (2014) (draft by Chairman Paul Ryan); CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING
HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STRENGTHENING THE EITC FOR
CHILDLESS WORKERS WOULD PROMOTE WORK AND REDUCE POVERTY 1 & n. 4
(2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-15-13tax.pdf
(discussing various proposals of Democratic senators).
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2. Premium Tax Credit
The premium tax credit, enacted as part of the Affordable Care
Act,52 is intended to ensure that health coverage is affordable to low-income
individuals by offsetting the costs of purchasing health insurance.53 The
statute provides that taxpayers who are married (within the meaning of Code
section 7703) must file a joint return in order to be eligible for the credit.54
This filing status restriction was not in the original version of the Senate bill
(the “America’s Healthy Future Act,” sometimes known as the “Baucus
Health Plan,” which was introduced on September 16, 2009), but then it
appears in the version passed as amended by the Senate Finance Committee
on October 19, 2009.55 The language imposing the restriction remains the
same in the final version of the Affordable Care Act.
The Treasury issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of
public hearing on the premium tax credit in August of 2011.56 The preamble
to these proposed regulations requested comments on rules for reconciling
the premium tax credit with advance payments for taxpayers whose filing
status changes during the taxable year, including those “who face challenges
in being able to file a joint return.”57 The preamble acknowledged that not all
married persons are able to file a joint return:
Some taxpayers who are married at the time they enroll in a qualified
health plan and begin to receive advance credit payments may not be
52.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010). Together with the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1030,
these are collectively known as the Affordable Care Act. The credit is codified at
I.R.C. § 36B.
53.
S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., EXPANDING HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE: PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE AFFORDABLE COVERAGE TO ALL AMERICANS
11 (Comm. Print 2009). For purposes of the premium tax credit, “low-income”
includes individuals with a household income between 100 and 400% of the federal
poverty level for the taxpayer’s family size. Id.
54.
I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C) provides: “If the taxpayer is married (within the
meaning of section 7703) at the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer shall be
treated as an applicable taxpayer only if the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s spouse file a
joint return for the taxpayer year.”
55.
S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 151–52 (2009).
56.
Prop. Reg. § 1.36B–1 to –5, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931–49 (Aug. 17, 2011).
57.
Id. at 50,937.
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able to file a joint return for the coverage year. For example, in
situations involving domestic abuse, when a divorce is pending but
not yet final, or when one spouse is incarcerated, filing a joint return
may not be possible or prudent.58
The preamble to the Treasury regulations issued in May 2012
provided a summary of the comments received in response to the notice of
proposed rulemaking.59 Commenters suggested there should be special rules
or exceptions for the circumstances noted in the proposed regulation
preamble and additionally suggested that abandoned spouses should be
eligible for such an exception from the credit’s joint filing requirement.60 The
regulations promulgated in 2012 did not include such an exception, but the
preamble noted that further regulations would be forthcoming to address
those issues. In March 2014, the Service released interim guidance for
married victims of domestic abuse.61 A few months later, the Treasury issued
temporary regulations adopting the rules set forth in the Service’s interim
guidance for victims of domestic abuse and also amending the 2012
regulations to include an exception for victims of spousal abandonment.62

58.
Id. at 50,938.
59.
T.D. 9590, 2012–24 I.R.B. 986.
60.
Id. at 994. For an unofficial transcript of the testimony at the
November 17, 2011, public hearing, see Health Plan Affordability Test Focus of IRS
Hearing, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-19 (Nov. 18, 2011). Two of the speakers
addressed this concern. Tara Straw, who at the time was the Legislative and Policy
Director for Health Care for America Now, noted: “Abandoned spouses also warrant
special protection. Some individuals have no choice but to file a separate return when
they cannot locate their spouse. This is a foreign concept in a lot of communities, but
I see this case at least once a week at my [volunteer tax return preparation] tax site.”
Id.
61.
Notice 2014–23, 2014–16 I.R.B 942.
62.
T.D. 9683, 2014–33 I.R.B. 330. The temporary regulations requested
further comments on the “appropriateness of the relief provided in the temporary
regulations, and the appropriateness of the scope of relief, including the
circumstances that would make a taxpayer eligible for relief.” Id. at 331.
Regulations.gov (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:59 PM), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D=IRS-2014-0025-0002) reports that 17 comments were received, and the content of
these is available at that site. Commenters voiced support for the regulations and
applauded the fact that the agency was mindful of these issues; many commenters
called for the rule to be broader still. I discuss some of the specific comments in Part
V, infra, in connection with my proposal that builds on the premium tax credit
exceptions.

Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf 26

12/21/2016 6:16:43 PM

2016]

Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately

420

These temporary regulations provide that a married taxpayer living
apart from his or her spouse at the time the return is filed who is a victim of
domestic abuse or spousal abandonment “satisfies the joint filing
requirement” of the premium tax credit if he or she files a married filing
separately return and certifies on the return that he or she meets the criteria
for the exception.63 The preamble to the temporary regulations explains that
the definition of “spousal abuse” provided in the temporary regulations is
based on the definition used for innocent spouse relief.64 Spousal
abandonment is separately defined.65 The temporary regulations include a
three-year rule applicable to both spousal abuse and abandonment: the
married taxpayer may not avail him or herself of this special exception to
joint filing for more than three consecutive tax years.66
To certify eligibility for the exception, taxpayers are instructed to
check a box labeled “relief” on the top right corner of I.R.S. Form 8962
(Premium Tax Credit).67 Service guidance advises taxpayers claiming such
relief to keep records documenting that the criteria for the exception are met,
but does not require the taxpayer to submit the records with the return.
Publication 974 suggests the following examples of records “that may be
useful,” noting that not all records apply in any given circumstance:
protective and/or restraining order
police report
63. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(ii), 79 Fed. Reg. 43,622, 43,627.
64. T.D. 9683, supra note 62, at 331. The preamble notes that the
definition used is based on Rev. Proc. 2013–34, 2013–2 C.B. 397. Id. The definition
is provided in temporary regulation § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(iii):
For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, domestic abuse
includes physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse, including
efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate, or to undermine the
victim’s ability to reason independently. All the facts and circumstances
are considered in determining whether an individual is abused, including
the effects of alcohol or drug abuse by the victim’s spouse. Depending on
the facts and circumstances, abuse of the victim’s child or another family
member living in the household may constitute abuse of the victim.
65. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(iv) defines abandonment as follows:
“For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, a taxpayer is a victim of spousal
abandonment for a taxable year if, taking into account all facts and circumstances,
the taxpayer is unable to locate his or her spouse after reasonable diligence.”
66. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(v), 79 Fed. Reg. at 43,627.
67. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 974, PREMIUM TAX CREDIT
(PTC) (2015).

Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf 27

12/21/2016 6:16:43 PM

2016]

Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately

421

doctor’s report or letter
A statement from someone who was aware of, or who
witnessed, the abuse or the results of the abuse. The
statement should be notarized if possible.
A statement from someone who knows of the
abandonment. The statement should be notarized if
possible.68
This exception protecting victims of spousal abuse and abandonment
is significant, as it is the only such exception to a rule limiting or denying
credits or deductions to married taxpayers filing separate returns. This
represents a very positive option for those taxpayers who qualify, provided
of course that they are aware that this exception exists. As I propose in Part
V, this exception and its procedural mechanism should serve as a model for
allowing those taxpayers who meet the criteria to also receive the EITC (and
other credits and deductions that are otherwise denied to separate filers).
Taxpayers who meet these criteria are particularly sympathetic in that they
cannot elect to file jointly and likely do not receive financial support from
their spouse and yet cannot claim the credits allowed to a similarly situated
taxpayer who can file as unmarried or head of household.
3. Limitations on Claiming the Standard Deduction
Married taxpayers who file separate returns cannot claim the
standard deduction if their spouse itemizes his or her deductions.69 This is
sound policy for couples who live together and act as one economic unit: if
this were allowed and one spouse had a significant amount of itemized
deductions to claim, the government would face a whipsaw if the other
spouse were allowed to claim a standard deduction.
While this limitation is sound policy in that scenario, it is harsh if the
couple is living separately and not acting as an economic unit. It is likely to
disproportionately punish a low-income spouse, who is less likely to have
high expenses such as home mortgage interest and state income taxes.70 In
68. Id. at 7–8.
69. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6).
70. Among all filers, approximately 30% of taxpayers itemize deductions.
As estimated by tax bracket for tax year 2010, itemizers equal 3.9% of taxpayers in
the 0% bracket, 16.2% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket, and 37% of taxpayers in the
15% bracket. Benjamin H. Harris & Daniel Baneman, Who Itemizes Deductions?,
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some cases, this limitation is completely impractical for taxpayers to
navigate: a couple that is estranged may not be on speaking terms with each
other, so might not have access to information such as whether the spouse
itemized in a particular year. This is particularly true in the case of abusive
relationships or abandonment.
Ideally, married taxpayers filing separately who live apart and
maintain separate households should be allowed to claim the standard
deduction regardless of whether their spouse itemizes. The proposals that
follow in Part V address the appropriateness of this in each scenario.
III. LIMITATIONS ON CHANGING ONE’S MIND: SECTION 6013
In Section A of Part II, I discussed some of the reasons that a
taxpayer might knowingly use married filing separate status, highlighting in
particular those situations in which married taxpayers do not have a viable
choice to file jointly.
I also highlighted the possibility that some low-income taxpayers do
not make the choice knowingly.71 As a result, some married couples file
separately (including sometimes incorrectly as head of household and single)
even though the couple lives together and may even have benefited by the
election of a joint return.
A different permutation on using the incorrect filing status is that
some low-income taxpayers knowingly engage in noncompliance because
they recognize that in their situation the best outcome is to file as unmarried.
In this context, the income limitation on joint filers claiming EITC creates a
structural incentive for a dual-earner couple to incorrectly represent
themselves as unmarried on individual returns so that they can each benefit
from the EITC (whereas they would face the income phase-out if they filed a
joint return). Leslie Book refers to this type of noncompliance as “symbolic
noncompliance,” which he defines as “intentional non-compliance that
taxpayers commit to address perceived injustices in the system.”72
So what happens if the taxpayer later changes his or her mind?
Perhaps he or she has a change of heart about the intentional
130 TAX NOTES 345 (Jan. 17, 2011). See also SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43012, ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 3
(2014) (showing 32% of filers itemized in 2011; among filers with adjusted gross
income up to $20,000, only 6% itemized; among filers with adjusted gross income
between $20,000 and $50,000, 22% itemized).
71.
See supra Part II.A.5.
72.
Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1176 (2007).
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misrepresentation. Perhaps he or she becomes better informed of the
consequences of filing using an unmarried filing status. Perhaps a separated
couple reconciles and wishes to file a joint return after having filed using
married filing separate status or even using an unmarried filing status, such
as head of household.
Until 1951, a married taxpayer could not change his or her mind
after filing: the choice to file jointly or separately was irrevocable.73 In 1951,
Congress amended section 51 (the predecessor to what is currently section
6013) to allow a change from a separate return to a joint one.74 In describing
the reason for the amendment, the Senate report noted that “a proper election
frequently requires informed tax knowledge not possessed by the average
person” and that the binding election “may result in substantially excessive
taxes.”75 In interpreting section 6013, courts have cited this language from
the legislative history.76
Section 51(g) (which became section 6013 with the enactment of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954) provided taxpayers the flexibility to change
from separate returns to a joint return, but Congress also imposed limitations
on changing one’s mind. While it is generally allowed within a certain time
period, it is not possible in all cases. Those taxpayers who cannot change
their mind and amend to file jointly are irrevocably stuck with the negative
consequences of their decision.
In its current iteration, section 6013(b)(1) provides that a taxpayer
who has filed “a separate return” in a year for which a joint return could have
been filed can later decide to make a joint return, except in four prohibited
situations, which are as follows:
(A) after the expiration of 3 years from the last date prescribed by
law for filing the return for such taxable year (determined without
regard to any extension of time granted to either spouse); or
73.
See Glaze v. U.S., 641 F.2d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 1981); S. REP. NO. 82781 (1951), as reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2018 (Westlaw).
74.
I.R.C. § 51(g) (1951).
75.
S. REP. NO. 82-781, as reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2018
(Westlaw). This remark referred both to the election to file a joint return and also the
election to take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing deductions; prior to the
enactment of Revenue Act of 1951 (Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 312, 65 Stat. 452, 488–90
(1951)); both elections were binding.
76.
See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 788 F.3d 834, 839 (8th Cir.
2015); Morgan v. Commissioner, 807 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1986); Glaze v. United
States, 641 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433,
441 (1986); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1401 (1970).
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(B) after there has been mailed to either spouse, with respect to such
taxable year, a notice of deficiency under section 6212, if the spouse,
as to such notice, files a petition with the Tax Court within the time
prescribed in section 6213; or
(C) after either spouse has commenced a suit in any court for the
recovery of any part of the tax for such taxable year; or
(D) after either spouse has entered into a closing agreement under
section 7121 with respect to such taxable year, or after any civil or
criminal case arising against either spouse with respect to such
taxable year has been compromised under section 7122.77
Of these four situations, the first two can have a particularly punitive
outcome for certain taxpayers who may regret their choice or inaction. The
next Section of this Article will explain two common scenarios in which
misguided or ill-informed low-income taxpayers choose to file separately (or
perhaps incorrectly as head of household) instead of jointly when the latter
option would have been correct and benefitted them more.
Following that, the next two Sections below describe the particular
burdens of the time limitation and the notice of deficiency limitation. This
Part then concludes with a discussion of a surprisingly unsettled issue: how
the Service and different courts interpret the term “separate return” for
purposes of 6013(b)(2).
A. Common Scenarios in Which Married Taxpayers File Separately and
Then Later Wish to Amend
In my work as director of a low-income taxpayer clinic, I encounter
two common scenarios in which married couples are likely to disadvantage
themselves by filing separately when there is no compelling reason to do so.
In each scenario, the couples would benefit from the advice of a competent
tax professional at the time of filing, but it is uncommon for low-income
taxpayers to seek or receive such advice.
Scenario one involves married couples in which one spouse (more
often than not, the wife) files a timely return and the other (more typically
the husband) is a nonfiler. Commonly, the filing spouse is a wage earner
subject to information reporting and withholding by the employer, while the
nonfiler is an independent contractor subject to the self-employment tax. The
filer makes one of two choices: she files correctly (but to her disadvantage)
using the “married filing separate” status, or she files incorrectly using the
77.
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“head of household” status. If a low-income couple78 has dependent children,
by filing a joint return it may be possible that the personal exemptions, the
standard deduction, the EITC, and the child tax credit would combine to
offset (in part or whole) the self-employment tax and the lack of withholding.
However, a couple who lacks proper information and tax advice does not
realize this; fearing a tax bill because of the self-employment tax and the
absence of withholding, the taxpayers make a decision to file as unmarried or
as married separate (or a decision for one to file and one not to file).
Assuming the independent contractor receives an I.R.S. Form 1099, the
Service will eventually discover the nonfiler and pursue an assessment
through the substitute for return procedure.79 By then, however, it may be too
late for the taxpayers to amend and file jointly.
Scenario two involves a married couple in which one spouse has
outstanding individual debt (i.e. not a joint debt) that is subject to the
Treasury Offset Program. This may include outstanding federal or state
income tax liabilities, past-due child support, or federal student loan debt.80
Often these couples are good candidates for an injured spouse allocation,
which is a procedure allowing spouses to file a joint return and request that
the non-liable spouse receive his or her allocable portion of the joint refund
due (while the liable spouse’s allocable portion is offset).81 However, the
couple is often either unaware of this option or does not know how to request
it.82 In this scenario, the non-liable spouse mistakenly believes it better to use
married filing separately than to file jointly and lose part or all of the
expected refund. However, in doing so, the non-liable spouse suffers the
78.
In this context, the term “low-income” is intended to include any
couple eligible for the EITC. According to census data, this may include around onethird of taxpayers with one or more children. Maggie R. Jones, Changes in EITC
Eligibility and Participation, 2005–2009, at 18 tbl.6 (U.S. Census Bureau, Ctr. for
Admin. Records Research & Applications, Working Paper No. 2014–04, 2014),
http://www.census.gov/srd/carra/Changes_in_EITC_Eligibility_and_Participation_2
005-2009.pdf.
79.
I.R.C. § 6020(b).
80.
I.R.C. § 6402(d).
81.
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 285.2(f) and (g); Rev. Rul. 85–70, 1985–1 C.B. 361;
I.R.M. 25.15.1.2.5 (section regarding relief from joint and several liability: injured
spouse claims). The allocation formula is described in the Internal Revenue Manual
in a section entitled, “Calculating the Injured Spouse's Share of the Overpayment.”
I.R.M. 25.18.5.3.
82.
The taxpayer should request injured spouse allocation using I.R.S.
Form 8379. The availability of injured spouse relief is described in the instructions
to I.R.S. Form 1040; that said, the instructions for tax year 2014 were 104 pages
long and the injured spouse option is mentioned in only one paragraph.
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disadvantages described in this Article. He or she may have been
economically better off filing jointly, even if a portion of the refund was
applied to the other spouse’s debt (in some cases, he or she would be better
off even if the entire refund was applied to the other spouse’s debt).
B. Three-Years Limitation
As noted above, section 6013(b)(2)(A) prohibits a taxpayer from
amending to file a joint return after the expiration of three years from the due
date of the return in question if one of the spouses has filed a separate return.
Accordingly, a spouse who files married filing separately,83 as in the two
common scenarios I describe above, has a limited time in which to amend
and file jointly. Thus in the nonfiler scenario, the nonfiler who comes into
compliance late by more than three years will have no choice but to file as
married filing separately for those years if his or her spouse filed a separate
return.
There is, however, disparate treatment among similarly situated
taxpayers. Where both spouses are nonfilers, no such time restriction on
filing jointly applies. The Service expects nonfilers to come into compliance
for at least the most recent six tax years;84 if there has been an assessment
based on a substitute return, it may be in the taxpayer’s interest to file returns
for still older years if doing so will reduce the liability. In cases in which
both spouses are nonfilers (including the case in which the working spouse
was a nonfiler and the other spouse did not have a filing requirement), these
couples benefit from the EITC to reduce (or even eliminate) the liability even
when they are time barred from receiving any refund that would have been
due.85 But in the cases in which one spouse was separately compliant, both
83.
As explained in section D of this Part, it is an unsettled question as to
whether a spouse who files single or head of household is subject to section
6013(b)(2)(A). The Service takes the view that such a spouse would be subject to the
three-year limitation. See infra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. However, a
spouse who incorrectly files as single or head of household will receive the EITC to
which he or she is entitled; thus, the dollar sums at stake for the nonfiler are
generally less significant than if the filing spouse correctly used the married filing
separately status.
84.
I.R.M. 4.12.1.3.
85.
Though section 6511 provides a general three-year statute of
limitation for refund claims, a taxpayer can claim the credit to reduce the liability to
zero even after the refund statute expiration date has passed. The Service does not
dispute that a married couple can file jointly if more than three years from the due
date has passed, so long as neither spouse has filed a return for that year. Rev. Rul.
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spouses are time barred from the chance to amend to married filing jointly;
thus they lose the chance to claim credits that would have reduced their
income tax liability. For these families, the overall higher liability will also
include higher accompanying penalties for failure to timely file and failure to
pay.86
While I do not advocate for an exception to the refund statute
expiration rule, I do not like the disparate treatment currently resulting from
section 6013(b)(2)(A). In the case of two nonfilers, they are allowed at any
time later to file a joint return and reduce their liability by the amount of any
credits that would have been due. But where only one taxpayer was a
nonfiler and one filed a separate return, the couple cannot avail themselves of
the benefit of a joint return once three years from the original due date have
passed. This lack of symmetry results in a troubling inequity.
Married taxpayers should be allowed to amend to file jointly without regard
to a time limitation in cases in which one or both spouses previously filed
separately and amending could reduce or eliminate an outstanding liability.87
C. Impact of Filing a Petition in U.S. Tax Court and the Recent Case Study
of Isaak Ibrahim
The other restriction in section 6013(b)(2) that is harmful to lowincome taxpayers is subsection (B), which prohibits the spouses from
amending to a joint return after a Notice of Deficiency has been issued and
one spouse files a petition in Tax Court. The likely scenario here is that the
married taxpayers use an unscrupulous return preparer who files an incorrect
return for one or both spouses using a filing status of single or head of
household. Taxpayers with low levels of education and those with low
72–539, 1972–2 C.B. 634. Prior to this revenue ruling, the Tax Court had held a
taxpayer who has not yet filed any return was precluded from electing joint filing
status once the three year statute of limitations had passed. Durovic v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364 (1970), aff’d on this issue (but reversed in part), 487
F.2d 36 (1973). Upon reconsideration of the issue after Rev. Rul. 72–539 was issued,
the Tax Court declined to continue following Durovic on this point, and instead
followed the more taxpayer-friendly Revenue Ruling. Following the decision, the
Service acquiesced. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433, 441 (1986), action
on dec. 1992–004 (Oct. 22, 1991).
86.
I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1)–(2). The penalties are calculated on the net
amount due. IRC § 6651(b).
87.
If this were permitted by the Code, I would also propose that upon the
filing of a joint return the statute of limitations on assessment (and thus on
examination) be reset for the taxpayer who had previously filed a separate return.
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English proficiency are especially vulnerable. It is well-documented that
unregulated return preparers intentionally misrepresent filing status and other
facts on tax returns to inflate refunds.88 The most vulnerable taxpayers may
not be aware of these misrepresentations or the consequences thereof, having
fully relied on the return preparer to fill out the return correctly.89 If the
return is subsequently selected for a correspondence audit,90 the taxpayer
may not understand or participate in the examination process.91
A recent and significant example of such a scenario is documented in
the Ibrahim v. Commissioner case.92 I discuss the broader statutory
implications of Ibrahim in the next Section, because it is part of a line of
cases illustrating how the definition of “separate return” is unsettled in the
courts. But the facts in this case illustrate fittingly how section 6013(b)(2)(B)
can be a trap for the unwary and are worthy of mention in detail here.93
88.
See WU, supra note 38; Michelle Lyon Drumbl, When Helpers Hurt:
Protecting Taxpayers from Preparers, 145 TAX NOTES 1365 (Dec. 22, 2014); Nina
E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX
NOTES 767 (May 13, 2013).
89.
See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who
Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and
Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113 (2013).
90.
EITC returns are twice as likely to be audited as the average
individual income tax return. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANN. REP. TO
CONGRESS vol. 1, at 300; Fiscal Outlook: Addressing Improper Payments and the
Tax Gap Would Improve the Government’s Fiscal Position: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Budget, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller
General of the United States) (also noting that “about 45 percent of correspondence
audits (audits done by mail) that closed in fiscal year 2013 focused on EITC
issues”).
91.
The Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a research study of “audit
barriers” to better understand EITC audit outcomes. Among the interesting findings,
the study revealed that the letters used in correspondence audits were not clear to the
recipients: more than 25% of the EITC taxpayers it surveyed “did not understand the
[Service] was auditing their return”; 39% “did not understand what the [Service] was
questioning about their EI[T]C claim”; and only 50% “felt they knew what they
needed to do in response to the audit letter.” NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011
ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS vol. 2, at 103–04.
92.
107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050 (2014), rev’d, 788 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015).
93.
Kathryn Sedo, whose low-income taxpayer clinic represented Mr.
Ibrahim before the Tax Court and the Eighth Circuit, calls section 6013(b)(2)(B) a
“procedural trap.” Kathryn Sedo & Frank DiPietro, Ibrahim v. Comm’r: A
Procedural Trap for Unrepresented Taxpayers, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/ibrahim-v-commr-a-procedural-trap-forunrpresented-taxpayers/.
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The decisions and the briefs of the parties describe Mr. Ibrahim and
his wife, Ms. Hassan, as refugee immigrants from Somalia who spoke
limited to no English.94 The couple relied on the ODAY Tax Service for tax
assistance in the tax year 2011.95 The preparers at ODAY spoke Somali, and
Mr. Ibrahim asserts that he told the preparer his correct marital status, but the
return was prepared incorrectly.96 The preparer completed a return for Mr.
Ibrahim as “head of household” and a separate return for Ms. Hassan as
“unmarried.”97 The couple was unaware of this inaccuracy; Mr. Ibrahim’s
education was the equivalent of less than a high school diploma and the
couple assumed that the professional tax service would prepare the tax
returns accurately.98
Subsequent to filing, Mr. Ibrahim’s return was selected for
examination. He was issued a Notice of Deficiency and filed a petition with
the Tax Court. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Commissioner conceded
that Mr. Ibrahim was entitled to the dependency exemptions and child tax
credits that were claimed.99 With the benefit of counsel now assisting him,
Mr. Ibrahim conceded that he was not entitled to head of household status.
He and his wife wished to amend to use married filing joint status. However,
the Commissioner argued that section 6013(b)(2)(B) applied to preclude their
filing a joint return. The outcome and merits of that argument are discussed
in detail in the next Section. As a practical matter for Mr. Ibrahim and Ms.
Hassan, the application of section 6013(b)(2)(B) meant that they were denied
the EITC they should have been entitled to, simply because they could not
correct their return to file jointly. If Mr. Ibrahim had been allowed to amend,
the couple would have received a refund of $5,151.100
Significantly, the Service examiner did not advise Mr. Ibrahim of
section 6013(b)(2)(B). The Notice of Deficiency does not mention the Code
section’s limitation. Had Mr. Ibrahim amended prior to filing a Tax Court

94.
The taxpayer’s brief states that they spoke no English. Brief for
Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14–
2070) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. The government’s brief states that his
“proficiency in English is very limited.” Brief for Appellee at 5, Ibrahim v. Comm’r,
788 F.3d. 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14–2070) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
95.
Brief for Appellant, supra.note 94, at 6; Brief for Appellee, supra note
94, at 6.
96.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 6.
97.
Id. at 6–7.
98.
Id. at 7.
99.
Id. at 1.
100. Id. at 9–10.
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petition, he would not have been barred from changing to joint filing
status,101 but he was not aware of this fact.
Why would a tax return preparer knowingly prepare the returns this
way? One can only speculate, but it is likely that the preparer did so to
maximize the tax refund for the clients. Mr. Ibrahim and his wife claimed a
total of three children on their separate returns; while the EITC allows a
married couple credit for up to three qualifying children, the return preparer
may have calculated that by splitting the children between two returns the
couple would benefit from two refunds that were collectively higher than
what they would have been entitled to on a joint return.102 Why would a
return preparer seek to increase a refund beyond what the taxpayer is entitled
to? Again, one can only speculate, but this practice is apparently widespread
among certain types of return preparers.103
Leslie Book argues that the structure of the EITC presents incentives for
certain types of taxpayers to intentionally misstate eligibility and claim the
credit.104 Though Book relies on different examples in making his argument,
the income limitation on joint filers claiming EITC creates another such
structural incentive: dual-earner married taxpayers filing jointly are subject
to the EITC phase-out at a level that is far less than twice the income level
for two unmarried individuals. Hence, there is an incentive for taxpayers (or
101. Petitioner-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2–3, Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788
F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2070).
102. As described in the Petitioner-Appellant’s brief, Mr. Ibrahim’s head of
household return claimed only two children. Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 1.
Ms. Hassan’s return is not before the court, but the details are described in the brief
for the Appellee. According to the appellee, Ms. Hassan claimed one child on her
unmarried return for the same tax year; when combined with her withholding and
additional child tax credit, this resulted in an overpayment amount of $3,778. Brief
for Appellee, supra note 94, at 7. I have no first-hand knowledge of this case, but I
am drawing on experience with my own clients and I presume that the return
preparer would not have filed the returns incorrectly unless it resulted in a larger
refund for the couple collectively. According to Appellee’s brief, Ms. Hassan has
four children. Mr. Ibrahim would be entitled to claim the stepchildren as dependents
regardless of whether he filed as head of household or married. Id. at 6. Also
according to Appellee’s brief, Mr. Ibrahim indicated in his pretrial memorandum that
he wished to claim the fourth child. Id. at 9 n.5. It is not clear why neither spouse
claimed the fourth child on the returns as originally filed.
103. For detailed examples of unscrupulous behavior by paid preparers, see
Brief for National Consumer Law Center & National Community Tax Coalition as
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 13–5061). See also WU, supra note 38.
104. Book, supra note 72, at 1171.
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their unscrupulous preparers) to incorrectly represent themselves as
unmarried on their return. Book argues that policymakers should consider the
structural incentives to cheat “in fashioning responses to the EITC error
rate.”105 In other words, removing such incentives may result in a lower rate
of noncompliance. Two of the proposals set forth in Part V would remove
the structural incentives in the context of filing status.
D. Unsettled Issue: What Is a “Separate Return” for Purposes of Section
6013(b)?
The limitations of section 6013(b)(2) apply when a taxpayer who
could have filed a joint return has instead filed “a separate return.” For this
purpose, however, “separate return” is not defined in the Code. Should it be
read to mean any return other than a joint return (including an erroneously
filed “single” or “head of household” return), or does it only apply to a
“married filing separately” return? There is no consensus on this issue.
The Tax Court has consistently interpreted “separate return” to
include a married taxpayer who files a return using any status other than
married filing jointly.106 The alternative interpretation gained traction in
Glaze v. United States, a refund case in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
U.S. District Court in interpreting “separate return” for the purpose of
6013(b)(1) to mean specifically a married taxpayer who previously elected to
file using the married filing separately status.107
The facts in Glaze were somewhat unusual in that the return in
question was filed posthumously by the estate’s administrator, who was
awaiting a jury determination as to whether the taxpayer was married at the
time of his death. Thus, the administrator could not elect between married
filing jointly or separately at the time of filing; he filed as single and
subsequently needed to change the status because the jury determined that
the taxpayer, in fact, had been married.108
105. Id. at 1185.
106. Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014) (citing
Currie v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 486 (1986); Blumenthal v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 590 (1983); Saniewski v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1979)).
107. Glaze v. United States, 641 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. The opinion, in searching for the legislative intent, emphasizes that the
estate administrator in Glaze did not make an affirmative election:
It is clear that Section 6013 was enacted as a matter of legislative grace
to permit married taxpayers to escape the adverse financial consequences
resulting from an injudicious election to initially file separate returns
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Despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Glaze, the Service and its
Office of Chief Counsel since have consistently taken the position that any
return other than a joint return is a “separate return” for purposes of section
6013(b)(1).109 Relying on advice from Chief Counsel, the Commissioner
argues that Congress could not have intended the term “separate return” to
refer to the status of married filing separately because that rate schedule had
not yet been created when the predecessor section to 6013(b)(1) was
enacted.110
Since Glaze, the Tax Court has continued to side with the
Commissioner on this issue, consistently adopting this same interpretation
outside of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.111 In the recent
case of Ibrahim v. Commissioner, the facts of which are described supra,112
the Tax Court again sided with the Commissioner, stating that it would
follow its prior precedent and decline to follow Glaze because it is was not

rather than a single joint return…. It is clear that Section 6013 was never
intended to cover situations such as the one presented here where a
taxpayer erroneously lists his status as single rather than married…It
would be absurd to advance the proposition that in enacting Section
6013(b)(1), (2) Congress had in mind the unusual factual circumstances
of this case.
Glaze, 641 F.2d. at 342, 344.
109. As such, the Service’s published guidance adopts this interpretation.
For example, Publication 501 states: “a separate return includes a return filed by you
or your spouse claiming married filing separately, single, or head of household filing
status.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 1, at 8.
110. C.C.N. CC–2006–010, 2006 WL 587325 (Mar. 2, 2006) (noting that
the predecessor section to 6013(b)(1) was enacted in 1951, whereas the married
filing separately rate schedule was not created until 1969). See also Rev. Rul. 83–
183, 1983–2 C.B. 220; A.O.D. 1981–140 (June 2, 1981).
111. See, e.g., Swonder v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 579 (1994);
Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433 (1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
issue, 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 590 (1983). The Tax Court is not bound to follow Glaze outside of the
circuits in which the decision is precedential. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,
757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Glaze is precedential in both the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because the Eleventh Circuit adopted all Fifth Circuit
precedent subsequent to Glaze. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
1981). Accordingly, Chief Counsel instructed its attorneys to challenge Glaze in all
circuits other than the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. C.C.N. CC–2006–010.
112. Supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
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controlling in a case to which appeal would lie in the Eighth Circuit.113 As it
has in the past, the Tax Court supported its decision with the rationale of
timing in its statutory interpretation, noting “the fact that Congress enacted
the predecessor statute to section 6013(b) in 1951 but did not establish a
separate rate structure for married taxpayers filing separately until 1969.”114
Mr. Ibrahim appealed his case to the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court. The court rejected the Commissioner’s
argument that “separate return” cannot mean “married filing separately”
because that filing status did not exist at the time the predecessor statute to
6013 was enacted:
The Commissioner is incorrect. Form 1040 for 1951 lists
“married person filing separately” in its tax table (with the
same rate as single taxpayers). The 1952 tax-form
instructions—interpreting the 1951 Act—repeatedly use
“separate returns” and allow only married taxpayers to file a
“separate return,” with different directions for head-ofhousehold taxpayers. Even in 1952, “separate return” did
not apply to those filing as head of household.115
Indeed, the Commissioner was incorrect. Married taxpayers had the option
to file a separate return long before 1951. In fact, the concept of a married
person filing a separate return predates the concept of a joint return.116
Married taxpayers were not given the option to report income on a joint
113. Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014).
114. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803(a), 83
Stat. 487, 676).
115. Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 F.3d 834, 840 (8 th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted). The Commissioner made this argument in its appeals brief:
[W]hen the first predecessor of Section 6013(b) was enacted in 1951,
the filing status of ‘married, filing separately,’ did not even exist. It
was enacted only in 1969. Congress obviously could not have meant
‘separate return’ to be limited to a filing status that would not be
created for many years to come.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 94, at 15.
116. For a history of the origins of the joint return and the subsequent
introduction of joint liability, see Richard C. E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem:
Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV.
317 (1990). See also Drumbl, supra note 17.
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return until 1918, five years after the enactment of the modern income tax
code.117
It is true that in 1951 there was not yet a separate rate structure
designated as “married filing separately” and correct that the rate structure
for that status was not created until 1969. The Service Chief Counsel made
this point in its prior published guidance to the Commissioner,118 and the
Tax Court adopted this rationale in interpreting “separate return” to mean
any return not filed jointly.119 However, this argument fails to appreciate the
historical context in which section 51(g) (current section 6013) was enacted.
In 1951, a joint return was by far the most favorable option available to
taxpayers. A couple who did not elect to file jointly was forsaking income
splitting, an option that was relatively new and not available to unmarried
taxpayers. Taken in this context, it makes sense that the oft-cited legislative
history—“[a]s a proper election frequently requires informed tax knowledge
not possessed by the average person, the binding election[] … may result in
substantially excessive taxes”120— referred to married couples reducing their
total tax liability through income splitting. In enacting section 51(g),
Congress wanted to add flexibility to taxpayers who could have elected to
file a joint return but did not do so—meaning only those who were married
but filed a separate return.
To better appreciate this context, a review of the evolution of the
filing statuses and rate brackets is instructive.
From 1918 until 1948, the applicable tax rates were the same for all
types of filers, with the result that a married couple who chose to aggregate
income on a joint return could be pushed into a higher tax bracket, which
meant the couple incurred a higher liability than if they had filed as two
individuals. Apart from the convenience of filling out only one form, the
benefit of joint filing occurred only in a scenario in which one spouse had
deductions or credits that could offset the income of the other spouse.121
117. See Beck, supra note 116, at 335.
118. See C.C.N. CC–2006–010, 2006 WL 587325 (Mar. 2, 2006); see also
Rev. Rul. 83–183, 1983–2 C.B. 220.
119. Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014).
120. S. REP. NO. 82-781, at 48 (1951).
121. See Grant v. Rose, 24 F.2d 115, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1928)
(summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of a married couple filing jointly),
aff'd, 39 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1930); see also Beck, supra note 116, at 337 n.78 (citing
legislative history (H.R. REP. NO. 77-1040) showing that, in 1938, when it was rarely
the case that a couple would benefit economically by filing jointly, 94% of married
couples filed a joint return). Beck points out that federal income tax rates were low
enough in 1938 that it made no difference in most people's tax rates whether they
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Separate rate brackets for married filing jointly were introduced in 1948.
Married taxpayers filing separately could not use these new brackets and
instead were subject to the rate brackets applicable to unmarried
taxpayers.122 These new separate brackets benefitted all married taxpayers
who filed jointly versus their unmarried peers and couples who filed
separately, because the married filing jointly brackets were exactly twice as
wide as the rate schedule for unmarried taxpayers. This allowed “income
splitting” between married couples123 and was the introduction of what we
now call the “marriage bonus” for those who file jointly.124 As is true today,
in 1948 the most dramatic example of the marriage bonus existed in a oneincome family: if the husband filed a separate return, he would have been
subject to the narrower unmarried income bracket, but if he filed a joint
return with his spouse who had no income, he was subject to an income
bracket twice as wide. This meant his rate of taxation would likely be lower
if he filed jointly. These differences were particularly pronounced in 1948
because the structure was steeply progressive. There were a total of 24
different rates applied to taxable income of individuals, and the marginal
rates ranged from 20% to 91%.125
filed jointly or separately; he posits that most of these couples filed jointly for the
sake of the convenience of filling out one form rather than two, rather than to
achieve tax savings. Id.
122. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948).
123. Between 1930 and 1948, married taxpayers in the nine community
property states already enjoyed the advantage of “income splitting” because each
individual was subject to tax on one-half of the couple’s total income. The Revenue
Act of 1948 created the wider bracket for married taxpayers in order to address the
disparity between common property states and community property states. See S.
REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184–1187
(Westlaw).
124. For a historical examination of marriage bonuses and penalties, see
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something about Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000). Zelenak notes that while the 1948 legislation
achieved couples neutrality, its purpose was “a delayed response to geographic
discrimination between husbands in separate property states and those in community
property states.” Id. at 4. Zelenak notes, as others have, that the goals of
progressivity, couples neutrality, and marriage neutrality are incompatible. Id. at 6.
125. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Nominal Dollars,
Income Years 1913-2013, TAX FOUNDATION, http://taxfoundation.org/sites/
taxfoundation.org/files/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal.pdf (last visited
Nov. 24, 2016). The effective rates, after statutory reductions, ranged from 16.6 to
82.13%. SOI Tax Stats—Historical Table 23, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-23 (last updated May 17,
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With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1951, at the same time
51(g) was introduced, the head of household status and accompanying rate
schedule was created. The purpose of this new filing status was “to grant
partial income splitting benefits to widows, widowers, and single persons
with dependents in their households.”126 The rate schedule for head of
household taxpayers was designed such that, at any income level, a taxpayer
filing as head of household would have an income tax liability “about
halfway between the tax paid by a married couple filing a joint return and a
single individual.”127
Over the next two decades, the sizable marriage bonus came to be
viewed by many as too unfair to unmarried taxpayers. Critics pointed out
that an unmarried person’s tax was as much as 42% higher than the tax paid
by a married couple filing jointly reporting the same total income as the
unmarried person.128 To address this inequity, the Tax Reform Act of 1969
introduced a lower rate structure for unmarried individuals, which was
separate from the rate structure applicable to married individuals filing
jointly or separately and also to head of household. The 1969 Act reduced
the rate structure only with respect to unmarried persons; it left intact the
prior rate structure with respect to married persons filing separately.
Congress did not want to leave a rate loophole for married taxpayers:
The prior law single person rate schedule was retained for
married persons filing separate returns because if each
spouse were permitted to use the new tax rate schedule for
single persons, many (especially those in community
property states) could arrange their affairs and income in
such a way that their combined tax would be less than that
on a joint return.129
Hence, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 created the rate brackets particular to
today’s filing statuses—not the filing statuses themselves. It also provided

2016) (consisting of data for “U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions and
Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years
1913–2015”).
126. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 91ST CONG.,
JCS-16-70, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 222
(1970) [hereinafter JCT, 1969 ACT].
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 223.
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relief to unmarried taxpayers, which reduced the significance of the
marriage bonus available to those who filed jointly.
Though I agree with the Eighth Circuit, reasonable legal minds can differ
as to the correct statutory interpretation of “separate return” within the
meaning of the Code as a whole. If the Service continues to advance its view
in Tax Court cases outside of the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, then
perhaps a circuit split will develop as to the interpretation.
In the meantime, the Eighth Circuit’s Ibrahim decision is an important
precedent for low-income taxpayers who improperly use the filing status of
single or head of household (whether knowingly or not) or rely on an
unscrupulous return preparer who does so on their behalf. What is the size of
the population impacted by the interpretation of “separate return”? The most
recent Service report estimating EITC compliance notes that among all EITC
claimants, two percent of those filing as single and nine percent of those
filing as head of household are estimated to have the correct status of married
filing separately.130 The report further notes that approximately one-fifth of
the taxpayers audited for EITC noncompliance due to filing status errors
“chose to change their filing status to married-filing-jointly as part of the
resolution of the audit rather than maintain two married-filing-separately
returns.”131 If the Service and Tax Court were to accept the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation, these categories of taxpayers would be allowed to change to
filing jointly regardless of whether a Tax Court petition had been filed.
IV. WHY A SPECIAL STATUS FOR MARRIED COUPLES?
A. A Very Brief History of Why the Joint Filing Status Exists
Much has been written about the how and why the Code allows
married taxpayers to file jointly.132 Though joint filing was originally
introduced as an administrative convenience to married taxpayers, the
current system evolved over many decades from a framework in which those
taxpayers who lived in community property states were permitted a tax
treatment that was not available to taxpayers who lived in the common law
states.133 Following the Supreme Court’s Poe v. Seaborn decision,134
130. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 20.
131. Id. at 20 n.43.
132. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 116; Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975); Zelenak, supra note 124.
133. See Beck, supra note 116; Bittker, supra note 132.
134. 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
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Congress recognized that it would be problematic not to allow married
couples in all states the option to report income on a joint return.135 Because
those distinctions among states still exist today, the rationale for a married
filing jointly rate bracket still exists.
As other scholars have on a variety of policy grounds,136 I have
argued elsewhere in favor of moving to a system of individual filing for all
taxpayers regardless of marital status.137 In this Article, however, I accept
that Congress is unlikely to abolish the option of a joint return. Under that
premise, my concern is to propose solutions to mitigate the inequities faced
by those who are “considered as married” but cannot avail themselves of the
benefits of joint filing, whether it is because joint filing is not an option or
because section 6013 limits their ability to file a joint return subsequent to a
non-joint one.

135 In addition to recognizing the need for consistent treatment of married couples
across community property and common law states, the legislative history to the
Revenue Act of 1948 notes that providing a different rate schedule for married
couples would simplify administration in other ways:
The incentive for married couples in common-law states to
attempt the reduction of their taxes by the division of their income
through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and family
partnerships will be reduced materially. Administrative
difficulties stemming from the use of such devices will be
diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation
on the income tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships.
S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163,
1187 (Westlaw).
136. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single
Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 684 (2010) (arguing that
the joint return should be abolished because it penalizes single people). See also
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–23 (1997) (advocating individual
filing as more beneficial for women); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the
IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L. J.
63, 108–10 (1993) (arguing that individual tax returns would be more equitable);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 395–96
(1994) (concluding that mandatory separate returns present the best option among
imperfect neutralities).
137. Drumbl, supra note 17.
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B. A Brief Word About Marriage Penalties and Disincentives
While it is well documented that married couples enjoy a number of
tax benefits by virtue of their marital status, it is also the case that for many
couples there are tax disadvantages to being married, even when they file a
joint return.138 Since 1969 when the unmarried brackets were adjusted
downwards, couples with two incomes have often found themselves subject
to a higher tax liability relative to what their liability would be as two
unmarried persons.
It is not just high earners who face a marriage penalty. Low-income,
unmarried taxpayers raising children in one household can structure their
filing status, dependency exemptions, and claim for the EITC so as to receive
significantly higher benefits than a similarly situated married couple would
receive.139
And it is not just the rate brackets that sometimes favor unmarried
taxpayers. The Ninth Circuit recently held that dollar limitations on the
deductibility of mortgage interest apply per taxpayer, not per residence, with
the result that an unmarried couple can collectively deduct twice as much
mortgage interest as that allowed to a married couple.140 In its opinion, the
court acknowledged that this interpretation creates a “marriage penalty.”141
Congress has acted in the past to address and reduce the marriage penalty,
notably in 2001 when it increased the standard deduction for joint filers and
also widened the 10 and 15% rate brackets for married filing jointly to twice
that of unmarried persons.142 In an earlier bill that passed the House but not
the Senate, the House Committee on Ways and Means acknowledged “the
138. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal
Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards
a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006); Theodore P. Seto,
The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529
(2008).
139. See Drumbl, supra note 17, at 127–33.
140. Voss v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the Code section 163(h)(3) limitations on the deductibility of mortgage interest are
applied on a per-taxpayer basis rather than on a per-residence basis), rev’g 138 T.C.
8 (2012); Kathleen Pender, Tax Ruling a Win for Unmarried People Who Own a
Home Together, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/
networth/article/Tax-ruling-a.-win-for-unmarried-people-who-own-a-6436357.php.
141. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1065.
142. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, §§ 301–02, 115 Stat. 38, 53 (2001).
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inequity that arises when two working single individuals marry and
experience a tax increase solely by reason of their marriage,”143 but the report
also notes that there is no solution that will please all constituents:
Any attempt to address the marriage tax penalty involves
the balancing of several competing principles, including
equal tax treatment of married couples with equal incomes,
the determination of equitable relative tax burdens of
single individuals and married couples with equal incomes,
and the goal of simplicity in compliance and
administration.144
Indeed, there is no way Congress can solve this conundrum; as the Second
Circuit wrote when it affirmed the Tax Court’s rejection of a married
couple’s constitutional challenge to the marriage penalty: “it is simply
impossible to design a progressive tax regime in which all married couples of
equal aggregate income are taxed equally and in which an individual's tax
liability is unaffected by changes in marital status.”145
Accepting that no system can result in equal treatment of all
taxpayers and that mandated individual filing would create new inequities to
which some groups would object, I instead propose three alternative reforms
that would address the concerns I have about low-income taxpayers who are
married but cannot viably elect to file a joint return.
V. THREE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD ALLOW LESS PUNITIVE SEPARATE
FILING FOR MARRIED TAXPAYERS
Parts II and III of this Article outline some of the ways in which the
married filing separately option is punitive for low-income couples. Part IV
143. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 6 (2001). This House bill (H.R. 6, 107 th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2001)) did not pass the Senate, but parts of the bill were
incorporated into H.R. 1836, which was enacted into law as Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P. L. No. 107–16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
144. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 6 (2001).
145. Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (1982) (citing Bittker, supra note
132, and quoting, “No algebraic equation, no matter how sophisticated, can solve
this dilemma. Both ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same time.” Tax Treatment
of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Working: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on
Taxation, 92d Cong. 78–79 (1972) (Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy)). See also Zelenak, supra note 136.
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provides a very brief historical context of joint filing and a summary of the
marriage penalty.
This Part will set forth three proposals to improve upon the current
system by providing alternatives that incentivize correct filing without
stripping separate married filers of the benefits to which joint filers and
unmarried filers are entitled.
What each proposal has in common is simple: taxpayers should not
be precluded from claiming EITC or other credits and deductions solely
because of filing status. The Code can do a better job of determining
eligibility and accommodating the nuances of relationships and economic
partnerships.
A. Extend the Premium Tax Credit Exception to Other Types of Credits and
Deductions
The first and most modest alternative I propose would likely be the
least costly and the smallest in scope. It builds on the exception provided for
the premium tax credit: allow married taxpayers filing separately to claim the
EITC (as well as any other credits or deductions otherwise denied to married
filing separately filers) if they certify that they live apart from their spouse
and are victims of spousal abuse or abandonment.146 Because this exception
already exists in a temporary Treasury regulation, the Service has an
established procedure for claiming the exception and has developed a list of
acceptable supporting criteria. The “relief” box currently shown on I.R.S.
Form 8962 could be moved to page 1 of the I.R.S. Form 1040 next to the box
for filing status, and it could be used for the purpose of claiming relief for all
credits and deductions rather than for just the premium tax credit.147

146. Fred Brown and Mary Leto Pareja have made similar
recommendations. See Fred Brown, Permitting Abused Spouses to Claim the Earned
Income Tax Credit in Separate Returns, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 453
(2016); Pareja, supra note 35, at 282 (“The principles behind allowing a Premium
Tax Credit to individuals who are unable to file jointly due to domestic abuse or
spousal abandonment apply equally to other tax credits, like the EITC, the adoption
credit, and educational credits.”).
147. Some organizations expressed a concern about the privacy
implications of the relief box, given that tax returns are sometimes used for mortgage
applications and other credit determinations. See, e.g., Letter from the National
Health Law Program to the Internal Revenue Service 2 (October 27, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0006 (placing the relief
box on page 1 of Form 1040 would simplify the procedure for taxpayers, but most
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Because these individuals live apart from their spouse and are
unlikely to receive any financial support, there is no economic rationale for
denying the credits—these are not taxpayers making a filing decision based
on the largest available refund. The taxpayers who fit within this exception
for relief are among the most financially vulnerable of all taxpayers—they
are individuals in transition, starting a life without the spouse they had
partnered with because their relationship deteriorated into a cruel ending. Of
all the taxpayers who should not be penalized for filing a separate return,
these generally will be the most sympathetic cases.
In response to the issuance of the premium tax credit temporary
regulations promulgated in July 2014, commenters on behalf of more than a
dozen different organizations submitted comments to Treasury. Most of
these letters begin by commending the Treasury and Service for recognizing
and addressing the situation these abused or abandoned spouses face, then
proceed to make specific suggestions as to how the Treasury and Service
might go farther to protect these taxpayers.148 For example, several
commenters suggest rescinding the three-year limit on claiming the
exception, arguing that this may be an insufficient time during which to
obtain a divorce in these circumstances.149
This proposal is more ambitious in scope than what the commenters
proposed. Taxpayers who certify that they live apart from their spouse and
are victims of spousal abuse or abandonment should be entitled to claim the
EITC and other credits and deductions now denied to separate filers. In a
similar vein and because of the compelling economic reasons, I propose they
should be entitled to claim the standard deduction regardless of whether their
spouse itemized on his or her return.

certainly exacerbates the privacy concern. For that reason, thought should be given
to indicating relief on a separate schedule that accompanies Form 1040.).
148. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Cong. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October 24, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0004;
Letter
from
EverThrive Ill. to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October 27, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0017; and Letter from
the N.M. Coal. of Sexual Assault Programs to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October
27, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0005.
149. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Cong. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, supra note 148, at 3–4 (noting that “on average, a woman leaves an
abusive partner seven to eight times before she is able to leave the relationship
permanently”).
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1. Pros of This Proposal
The primary advantage of this proposal is that it builds upon ideas
that are implemented in existing regulations and procedures. In addition, the
population it would reach is especially vulnerable and sympathetic, making it
a change that is easy to justify from a policy standpoint.
2. Cons of This Proposal
This proposal has two significant shortcomings, in my view.
First, it is too modest. While I certainly favor relief for these
sympathetic filers, I also believe relief should be extended more broadly (as I
envision in my next two proposals).
Second, this proposal would require expanding the exception to all
filers, not just premium tax credit claimants. The premium tax credit is
available only to those taxpayers with an annual income of between 100 and
400% of the federal poverty line.150 For a one-person household in 2014, this
meant an annual income between $11,670 and $46,680.151 Additionally, the
taxpayer cannot claim the premium tax credit if he or she is eligible for
Medicaid, Medicare, or an employer-provided plan.152 One report estimates
that “more than 4.2 million households…are likely to qualify for both the
EITC and premium credit.”153 An estimated 28 million tax returns claim the
EITC.154 Thus, perhaps only 15% of total returns claiming EITC would also
be claiming the premium tax credit.
I fear that allowing more tax benefits through this procedure would
have the perverse effect of bringing down greater scrutiny upon the taxpayers
who check the “relief” box. This is a difficult subject matter for the Service
150. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A).
151. 79 Fed. Reg. 3,593 (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Jan. 22,
2014) (poverty guideline for D.C. and 48 contiguous states).
152. I.R.C. §§ 36B(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f).
153. Elizabeth Kneebone, Jane R. Williams & Natalie Holmes, Connecting
EITC filers to the Affordable Care Act Premium Tax Credit, BROOKINGS INST., Mar.
18, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/03/eitc-filers-affordablecare-act-tax-credit-kneebone-williams-holmes. The 4.2 million figure relates to “tax
returns,” or tax returns filed. The authors note that this figure represents
approximately 7.5 million people. Id.
154. SOI Tax Stats—Historical Table 1, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-1 (last updated Oct. 5, 2015)
(consisting of data for “Individual Income Tax Returns: Selected Income and Tax
Items for Tax Years 1999–2013”).
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to audit, with the same sensitivities and evidentiary complexities that make
innocent spouse relief determinations so time (and resource) consuming.155
In a world in which only the premium tax credit is at stake, perhaps the
Service may be more likely to take taxpayers at their word when they certify
they meet the criteria for relief.
This proposal, though not my favored solution, would be better than
the status quo. It also would be the easiest proposal to implement because the
Service and Treasury have already developed a framework for the necessary
administrative procedures to claim such an exception.
B. The Canadian Case Study: Credits and Deductions Should Be
Determined Based on a Couple’s Household Income, Not on Marital Status
This proposal draws upon certain features of the Canadian income
tax filing system. It suggests an approach to more appropriately allocate
credits across households, particularly child-based credits. It proposes that
the Code should not deny credits to a married taxpayer living apart from his
or her spouse, but instead allocate those credits per separate household as if
the taxpayers were unmarried. In tandem with this, it takes the idea of
household income a step further in order to address the current inequitable
practice of allowing unmarried but cohabitating parents to split multiple
children among them and both benefit from the EITC at income levels that
would not permit the same result if they were married filing jointly. Both
ideas constitute a significant departure from our current system but together
would result in a more equitable policy vis-à-vis households with children.
1. Characteristics of the Canadian System
In Canada, as is the case in many other countries, returns are filed by
individuals—there is no option for a joint return for married taxpayers. The
base for computing individual tax liability is individual income, not
combined family income.
However, combined family income is used to determine eligibility
for certain purposes, such as the Canada Child Tax Benefit.156 For the
155. For a discussion of the sensitivities and complexities of innocent
spouse relief determinations, see Drumbl, supra note 17, at 114–119 (Part III.B).
156. For a helpful overview of the various ways in which marital or family
status is relevant in the Canadian income tax system despite its use of an individual
filing system, see Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal
for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605 (2010).
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purpose of determining this tax-free monthly benefit, which is administered
by the Canada Revenue Agency, family income is defined to include that of
the taxpayer’s “cohabiting spouse or common-law partner,” defined as:
the person who at that time is the individual’s spouse or
common-law partner and who is not at that time living
separate and apart from the individual and, for the purpose
of this definition, a person shall not be considered to be
living separate and apart from an individual at any time
unless they were living separate and apart at that time,
because of a breakdown of their marriage or common-law
partnership, for a period of at least 90 days that includes that
time157
The Canada Income Tax Act defines “common-law partner” as follows:
a person who cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship
with the taxpayer and
(a) has so cohabited throughout the 12-month period that
ends at that time, or
(b) would be the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is a
parent . . .
and, for the purpose of this definition, where at any time the
taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship,
they are, at any particular time after that time, deemed to be
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were living
separate and apart at the particular time for a period of at
least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a
breakdown of their conjugal relationship158
157. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.).
158. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 248 (Can.) (emphasis
added). See also Hendricken v. The Queen, 2008 T.C.C. 48, 2008 Can. Tax Ct.
LEXIS 76, at *8-9 (listing factors to be considered in determining whether taxpayers
were in a “conjugal relationship”); Jamie Golombek, The Tax Costs of Shacking Up,
FIN. POST (Oct. 8, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/personalfinance/the-tax-costs-of-shacking-up; Brad Taylor, Married vs. Common Law—
What’s
the
Difference
Anyway?,
LAW NOW,
(Mar.
8,
2015),
http://www.lawnow.org/married-vs-common-law-whats-the-difference/
(summarizing the distinction for tax purposes and noting that this definition of
“common-law partner” is specific to the federal income tax act and is different than
the meaning for family law purposes in Canada).
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Under these definitions, “family income” tracks beyond that which the
United States captures in relying on legal marital status. It encompasses the
combined income of unmarried taxpayers living together in a relationship for
more than a year, as well as unmarried couples who have a child or children
together, regardless of the length of time of cohabitation.159 In order for a
taxpayer to receive the Canada Child Tax Benefit, both the taxpayer and his
or her cohabitating spouse or common-law partner must file an individual
income tax return, even if one is not otherwise required to do so.160 The
taxpayer is required to enter the spouse or partner’s social insurance number,
name, and net income in order to claim the benefit.161
In spite of its mandated individual filing system, it should be noted
that there are certain tax advantages in Canada to being married or having a
common-law partner.162 One recent example of this is the introduction of
income splitting, which gained steam particularly among proponents in the
Conservative party during the time Steven Harper was Prime Minister. In
2007, Canada adopted income splitting for pension income.163 In 2014,
Canada enacted a federal “Family Tax Cut,” which allowed a higher-income
spouse/common-law partner to notionally transfer income to a
spouse/common-law partner in a lower tax bracket if the couple has children
under the age of 18.164 Critics of the income-splitting measures charge that it
159. The cross-references in subparagraph (b) of the Canada Income Tax
Act section 248(1) definition of common-law marriage serve to narrow the definition
of “parent” by excluding children of the common-law partner who are not the
taxpayer’s children and excluding what would be in-law relationships. R.S.C. 1985,
c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 248(1) (Can.) Thus, a taxpayer who cohabitates in a conjugal
relationship for less than 12 months and is not the parent of a child by that
relationship is not a “common-law partner” for purposes of the Canada Income Tax
Act.
160. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.61 (Can.).
161. See Canada Revenue Agency, Form 5000-R T1 General 2015, at 1,
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pbg/tf/5000-r/README.html.
162. Some of these policies might be rolled back or eliminated following
the November 2015 election, as the Liberal party ran on a platform that proposed to
eliminate income splitting (but not pension splitting) and replace the Canada Child
Tax Benefit with a Canada Child Benefit. See JUSTIN TRUDEAU’S PLAN FOR
FAIRNESS FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS, https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/05/Fairnessfor-the-Middle-Class.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).
163. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 56(1)(a.2), s. 60(c),
s. 60.03, s. 220(3.201) (Can.).
164. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 119.1 (Can.); see also
TIM SCHOLZ & TREVOR SHAW, OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICER,
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disproportionately benefits wealthier families165 or that it provides the least
benefit to low-income families.166
2. My Proposal—Calculate Credits on Household Income Based on
Residence, Not Strictly on Marital Status
The United States could switch to a model built upon this Canadian
approach. Under this proposal, Congress would retain the current filing
statuses and brackets, keeping intact any benefits of income splitting for
married taxpayers who file jointly and the less favorable brackets for married
filing separately that apply at higher income levels. But instead of a blanket
denial of credits to married taxpayers who file separate returns, I propose that
income eligibility be determined based on whether the taxpayers live
together or live, in the words of the Canada Income Tax Act, “separate and
apart.” This would replace (or at a minimum could supplement) the Code’s
current determination of whether a taxpayer is “considered as married,”167
which in my view is far too restrictive for couples who part ways and take up
separate residences.
I am in favor of a using a measurement more favorable to separated
couples than what is currently permitted for the “considered as married” rule.
Under current section 7703, a taxpayer must live apart for at least the last six
months of the taxable year to “not be considered as married.” This is too
punitive a measurement, in my view, for couples who are newly separated.
Recall also that if there are no qualifying children, the taxpayers who live
apart the entire year but who are not yet “legally separated from his spouse

THE FAMILY TAX CUT, (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/
Family_Tax_Cut_EN.pdf.
165. DAVID MACDONALD, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES,
INCOME SPLITTING IN CANADA: INEQUALITY BY DESIGN 20–21 (2014),
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%
20Office/2014/01/Income_Splitting_in_Canada.pdf (calling income splitting “a tax
loophole big enough to drive a Rolls Royce through” and stating that “[t]he richer
the family, the more it stands to gain; the poorer the family, the more it stands to
lose”).
166. John Geddes, The Surprising Spoils of Income-Splitting: We’ve Got
New Numbers on Who Gets How Much, MACLEAN’S (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/new-numbers-on-who-wins-from-incomesplitting/.
167. I.R.C. § 7703; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance” will still be
“considered as married” for tax filing status purposes.168
I prefer Canada’s approach of using a 90-day period as a measure of
whether taxpayers are living “separate and apart” from one another. Thus, I
propose that taxpayers who have moved out of the marital home due to a
break of at least 90 days in the relationship but who are not yet legally
separated be given more flexibility. They still would have the option to file a
joint return (assuming an amicable split) or as married filing separately, just
as they do now. Unlike under the current Code, though, my proposal would
not automatically deny certain credits to separate filers. Instead, these
separate filers would have the option to self-designate as a “separate and
apart” household, with the result that their eligibility would be calculated
based upon household income. In other words, a low-income taxpayer who
separates from her spouse for a period of at least 90 days would be eligible
for the EITC and the rules would apply as if she were unmarried. At the
same time, a higher-income taxpayer who separates would face the EITC
income phase-out as if she were unmarried.
Ninety days—approximately three months of living apart—is a long
enough period to measure whether a couple is having serious relationship
difficulty. After such a period, the couple is likely to have diverging financial
interests because they are maintaining separate households. Congress should
exclude from the 90-day measure any periods of temporary absence such as
attending school away, being apart for work or health reasons, or
incarceration.169 For tax purposes, the Canada Income Tax Act measures the
90 days not as physical absence but time apart “because of a breakdown of
their marriage or common-law partnership.”170
Under this proposal, I would allow taxpayers who are living apart as of
December 31 to use a 90-day rule that spans two tax years (as opposed to
rigidly measuring the last 90 days of the tax year). Thus, if a married couple
splits up on December 15, Year 1 and remains apart (living in separate
residences, not because of a temporary absence) as of March 15, Year 2, the
taxpayers would be considered to be “separate and apart” as of the end of
Year 1 for filing purposes. After all, relationships and life decisions do not
neatly follow a calendar-year schedule. In terms of economic impact, this
168. I.R.C. § 7703.
169. Currently, the Code does exclude similar temporary absences from its
determination of marital status with respect to the principal place of abode of the
taxpayer (note however, that the Treasury Regulations do not include incarceration
in its list of situations that constitute a “temporary absence due to special
circumstances”). Reg. § 1.7703–1(b)(3).
170. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.).
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would be no less arbitrary a rule than allowing taxpayers who wed on
December 31 to file a joint return or than allowing taxpayers to claim as a
qualifying child in Year One a baby who is born on December 31, Year
One.171 In terms of administrative convenience and certainty, taxpayers
invoking the separate-and-apart rule will know whether they have satisfied
the 90-day requirement in advance of the April 15 return filing deadline even
if the split occurred at the very end of the tax year.
In addition to easing the rule for spouses who separate, my proposal
would also move the U.S. system one important and different step further
toward treating similarly situated taxpayers similarly: borrowing from the
Canada Child Tax Benefit, I would predicate EITC income eligibility on the
household income of parents who live together but are unmarried.
Currently, two unmarried taxpayers raising children together receive
more favorable treatment than a married couple raising children together.
This is because one taxpayer can file as single, the other as head of
household; unlike a married couple filing jointly, each is subject to earned
income phase-outs separately; together they receive a higher aggregate EITC
than if they were married filing jointly.172 This presents as a whipsaw and
runs contrary to the intended anti-poverty policy of both the EITC and head
of household filing status,173 yet it is currently allowed by the Code.
The current rules for claiming qualifying children are complex and
cover many possible situations. The rules do not allow different taxpayers to

171. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1).
172. For illustrations of the resulting disparities between similar
households, see Drumbl, supra note 17, at 127–129.
173. The head of household status was enacted in 1951 as a way to extend
tax relief to single persons with dependents based on an assumption that the
household was run by a single parent:
The income of a head of household who must maintain a home for
a child, for example, is likely to be shared with the child to the
extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the
child. This, it is believed, justifies the extension of some of the
benefits of income splitting. The hardship appears particularly
severe in the case of the individual with children to raise who,
upon the death of his spouse, finds himself in the position not only
of being denied the spouse’s aid in raising the children, but under
present law also may find his tax load heavier.
H.R. REP. NO. 82-586, at 11 (1951).
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claim the same child for different purposes.174 For example, if an unmarried
couple with one child lives together, the mother cannot claim the child for
purposes of the dependency exemption and the child tax credit while the
father claims the same child for the EITC and head of household filing
status. If both parents claim the same child on separate returns, the Code
resolves the dispute with a “tie-breaker” provision that favors the parent with
the higher adjusted gross income.175
But the Code does allow parents filing separately to split different
children between their returns in any fashion, so long as the various
requirements are met. Thus, an unmarried couple that lives together with
their three children can calculate which division would benefit them the most
collectively based upon their respective income levels. In many situations,
the couple benefits both by the fact that their incomes are not aggregated and
also because they receive a collective standard deduction higher than that of
a married couple. Take a very simple example, in which both individuals
have adjusted gross income (all of it earned income) of $25,000. Using the
inflation tables from tax year 2014,176 an unmarried taxpayer with earned
income of $25,000 would receive an EITC of $2,155 for one child and an
EITC of $3,945 for two children—collectively, the unmarried couple
receives EITC of $6,100 for their three children. If, however, the couple
were married and filed jointly, their earned income on the joint return totals
$50,000 and due to the phase-out, they would have received an EITC of only
$506. Economically, the households look the same: two parents, three

174. A significant and notable exception is provided for divorced and
separated parents (including parents who were never married and are now living
apart). Section 152(e) of the Code permits the custodial parent the ability to grant
permission to the non-custodial parent to claim the child for purposes of the
dependency exemption and the child tax credit. In this case, the custodial parent can
claim the same child for purposes of head of household status and the EITC. The
non-custodial parent must obtain the custodial parent’s signature on I.R.S. Form
8332 and attach it to his or her return. Note that this is the only permutation: the noncustodial parent is never allowed to claim EITC or head of household status with
respect to the child that does not reside with him or her at least half the nights of the
year.
175. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(4).
176. Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537. For the full EITC tables, see
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 596, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EIC) 29–
35 (2015).
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children, and $50,000 of income. But one household receives $5,594 more in
anti-poverty assistance than the other.177
This current flexibility for unmarried filers, and the resulting tax
advantages, is what drives some noncompliant taxpayers or unscrupulous
return preparers to incorrectly file one parent as single and the other as head
of household when in fact the couple is married (as seen in the example of
the Ibrahim case). The noncompliance follows the opportunity and the
money. If these incentives are removed from the Code, the rate of
noncompliance allocable to the incentive should drop accordingly.178
To address this inconsistency among married and unmarried parents who
live together and to provide relief to married taxpayers living apart and filing
separately, I propose that the EITC tables be restructured. Currently, these
tables follow the filing statuses. Instead, I propose that the income phase-outs
and EITC amounts be based upon household. Taxpayer parents living alone
(i.e., if married, living “separate and apart” from their spouse) or with a
taxpayer who is not the parent of their child should be entitled to the phaseouts and amounts currently allowed to a single filer (the current EITC
structure does not differentiate between single and head of household with
regard to EITC amounts and phase-out levels, and I would keep it that way).
Taxpayer parents who file individually but live with the parent of one or
more of their children should be entitled to the amounts that would be
allowed to a married couple filing jointly based on the couple’s aggregate
household income.179
To return to the earlier example: under my proposal two unmarried
individuals, each with earned income of $25,000, must aggregate their
income, and either taxpayer would be allowed to receive the amount allowed
to a married couple with a joint income of $50,000. In this case, if the
taxpayers chose to split their three children between their two returns, neither
would receive any EITC; if one parent claimed all three children, the filer

177. Additionally, the taxpayer who files as head of household receives a
standard deduction of $9,100 as opposed to the $6,200 allowed to a single filer. Rev.
Proc. 2013–35, supra note 176. Collectively, the couple enjoys an aggregate
standard deduction on their individual returns of $15,300. Contrast this with a
married couple filing jointly, which is allowed a standard deduction of only $12,400.
Id. This is yet another tax advantage currently afforded to unmarried couples who
cohabitate.
178. See generally Book, supra note 72. See supra Part III.C (discussing
Book’s theories of structural incentives for noncompliance).
179. That is, following the model of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit
calculation.
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would be entitled to an EITC of $506, just the same as a similarly situated
married couple would receive.180
For similar structural reasons, I propose that a filer who lives separate
and apart from his or her spouse and files a separate return should be allowed
to take the standard deduction regardless of whether the spouse itemizes.
a.

Pros of This Proposal

The major advantage of this proposal is that it sheds the rigidity of
marital status in favor of the reality of how income and expenses are shared.
Thus, if spouses are separated more than temporarily, each can file as
married filing separately and indicate on the return that he or she lives
“separate and apart” from his or her spouse. And if an unmarried couple is
sharing expenses and raising children together, this too should be taken into
consideration.
The EITC is an anti-poverty program, and this proposal is designed
with that foremost in mind. Denying a married taxpayer filing separately the
opportunity to claim the EITC makes sense only in a context in which
spouses are sharing income and expenses and their combined income
exceeds the income phase-out for EITC. In that context, it prevents the
whipsaw of the lower-earning spouse claiming the credit while his or her
spouse is earning an income well above poverty level and the couple shares
expenses jointly. In the context in which spouses are living apart and not
sharing income or expenses, it does not make sense to rule out EITC
eligibility for married filing separately.
In the meantime, plenty of taxpayers are unmarried but sharing
income and expenses, yet can claim the EITC if individually each is income
eligible. As discussed, this can result in a tremendous disparity between
unmarried couples and married couples (with resulting structural incentives
for symbolic noncompliance). This disparity may become more significant in
scale if marriage rates decline over time in favor of cohabitation, with a
resulting increase in the number of cohabitating unmarried parents.181 My
180. The Canadian system defaults to primary caregiver as the credit
recipient and includes a presumption that the mother is the primary caregiver.
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.). I would allow the
taxpayers to choose for themselves who should receive the credit. In the event both
taxpayers claim the EITC, I would follow something like the current tiebreaker rule,
which gives it to the spouse with the higher adjusted gross income. I.R.C.
§ 152(c)(4)(B)(ii).
181. See, e.g., Neil Shah, U.S. Sees Rise in Unmarried Parents, WSJ.COM
(Mar. 10, 2015 2:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cohabiting-parents-at-record-
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proposal addresses that disparity by determining EITC based upon the
combined income of the parents living together, which is how the Canadian
Child Tax Benefit is designed. In this regard, the proposal addresses an issue
much larger than just my concerns about married filing separately: it
addresses the fundamental disparities that result from the Code using
marriage as a proxy for economic interdependence.
This proposal is the approach that I would favor the most in terms of
economic results for similarly situated taxpayers. As with any new proposal,
there are downsides to the idea.
b. Cons of This Proposal
The major downsides of this proposal are: 1) it adds another layer of
complexity for low-income taxpayers; and 2) while it will remove certain
incentives for noncompliance, it will pose new administrative and
enforcement challenges for the Services.
As to complexity, it creates two new tests for taxpayers to wade through. In
the current system, one only needs to know whether the taxpayer is married
and whether he or she might meet the exceptions to be not considered as
married under section 7703. Under this proposal, marital status is only a
starting point; taxpayers must then determine whether they qualify for the
EITC on the basis of living “separate and apart” from their spouse. This is
not terribly onerous, given that these taxpayers will be looking for any
exception that might allow them the EITC.
The far more significant administrative challenge is that unmarried
taxpayer couples with children would become subject to new rules and an
income limitation that does not apply currently. The Service would need to
educate taxpayers about the new rule and create new forms and schedules to
help taxpayers determine whether and how it applies to them.
As to enforcement, the proposal would create a new noncompliance
incentive: cohabitating unmarried parents might misrepresent their address
on the return so as to claim the higher EITC to which they would not be
high-1426010894 (citing data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
showing “just over a quarter of births to women of child-bearing age—defined here
as 15 to 44 years old—in the past five years were to cohabiting couples, the highest
on record and nearly double the rate from a decade earlier”). The CDC data reflected
an overall decline in nonmarital childbearing since 2007, with an increased
percentage of nonmarital births occurring within a cohabitating union. SALLY C.
CURTIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, RECENT DECLINES IN
NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, NCHS DATA BRIEF, NO. 162
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db162.pdf.
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entitled if their household income were aggregated.182 The Service would
have to crosscheck addresses in its enforcement data bases and undertake
correspondence examinations for suspicious returns, leaving taxpayers to try
and prove the address they used on the return was their bona fide address.183
This opens up a new headache for EITC claimants, as the correspondence
examination process is slow and systemically difficult to deal with;184 some
percentage of taxpayers would face delays in receiving their refund or end up
unfairly denied a credit to which they should have been entitled.
The Service would have to disallow the use of post office boxes as
addresses on returns, because otherwise that would be an obvious end-around
for these taxpayers. Certainly some portion of taxpayers would get away
with this type of noncompliance.
Another complication is what to do when one unmarried
cohabitating parent is a nonfiler. For the proposal to work, the household
income must be known. It seems reasonable to require both parties to file in
order for one to claim EITC: after all, they share a household and thus share
economic incentives. But what if one of the parents does not have any
taxable income, whether because he or she doesn’t work, receives social
security disability benefits, or receives supplemental security income?
Currently, these taxpayers are not required to file. Would the Service want to
bring them back into the filing system for this purpose? This would greatly
increase the number of returns the Service would receive for processing.
Further, what if one parent was simply a chronic nonfiler? By the time that
the Service caught up with that person via its underreporter program and
substitute-for-return procedures, it may be too late for the Service to correct
the amount of earned income tax credit claimed by the partner taxpayer.
Should Congress enact a special rule extending the statute of limitation on
assessment for such cases?

182. Cohabitating married parents might also choose to misrepresent their
address so as to claim the “separate and apart” rule, but in so doing, they would
forsake the potential benefits from filing jointly, such as income splitting.
183. Proving residence is already a very common EITC audit issue, but
under the current rules the taxpayer is asked to prove he or she lived with the
qualifying child for more than one-half the year. Under this proposal, taxpayers may
find themselves trying to prove that they did not live with the EITC claimant for the
requisite period of time.
184. For a discussion of EITC audit barriers, see Drumbl, supra note 89, at
132–39.
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These are certainly not insurmountable challenges. After all, the
Canada Revenue Agency has implemented such a system for more than two
decades.185 But they would be new challenges.
C. A More Generous Idea: Allow One-Half the Credit a Single Filer Would
Get, Based on the Married Filing Separately Taxpayer’s Income, Regardless
of Total Household Income
The third proposal is potentially the most costly but offers interesting
economic advantages. This proposal would retain the emphasis on marital
status and section 7703’s determination as to who is considered as married,
and unlike the second proposal it is not concerned with household income.
To the contrary: here I propose to ignore the household income altogether,
and allow married filing separate filers to claim the EITC based on their
income, but only the amount that is one-half that which an unmarried filer
would be entitled to at the same income level.
This proposal is different than the prior two proposals in that it
potentially affords new benefits to married taxpayers who live together: it
does not contemplate that they must live apart. Thus it extends beyond the
sympathetic category of married taxpayers who have no choice but to file
separately. For this reason, the proposal is specific to the EITC and does not
contemplate changes to the other limitations on separate filers. For example,
this third proposal does not contemplate that separate filers should be entitled
to claim the standard deduction if the taxpayer’s spouse itemizes.
Under this proposal, married couples with relatively lower incomes
may be better off (measured as an economic unit) filing separate returns than
filing a joint return. This is of course a departure from our current system, in
which it is quite rare for any couple to be collectively better off filing
separate returns than a joint return.
At higher collective income levels, this is less likely to be true; as
my examples illustrate, a relatively high-earning married couple still would
be better off filing a joint return. Thus, many married couples who live
together likely would still file jointly. But couples who are estranged are not
penalized with the denial of EITC.
While there are seemingly endless permutations that might illustrate
this idea, I have set forth three scenarios below.186 When imagining these
185. The Canadian Child Tax Benefit was enacted in 1993. For an
overview of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit’s history and the overlapping tax
benefits aimed at Canadian parents, see Kevin Milligan, A Reset for the Child Tax
Benefit System, 34 INROADS J. 52 (2013).
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examples, I considered that the estimated median household income for
married couples was $76,509 in 2013.187 To use points of relative income
comparison, I have chosen to illustrate a couple earning below, at, and above
this figure. In each scenario, I assume the wife earns income of $20,000188
and the couple has two children. Choosing this particular figure for the
wife’s income is a bit arbitrary, but it needs to be relatively low to illustrate
the proposal: an unmarried person with this amount of income would receive
a significant EITC if she had at least one qualifying child (though the income
phase-out would have already begun to take effect at that level). The
question of EITC becomes less relevant (and eventually irrelevant) as both
spouses begin to earn more; for this reason, I have maintained an income
disparity between the spouses, with this disparity widening as the couples’
household income rises.
1.

Scenario Examples

a.
Earns $60,000

Household Income Below the Median: Married Couple

At the lower household income level, imagine a husband with an
adjusted gross income of $40,000 and a wife with adjusted gross income of
$20,000. As joint filers, they would not be entitled to any EITC because their
$60,000 total income exceeds the married filing jointly phase-out for the
credit.
186. All examples use tax year 2014 figures and assume the taxpayers
claim the standard deduction.
187. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU ET AL., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2013, at 6 tbl.1 (2014) (indicating that the estimated median
household income is lower ($50,625) for a male head of household with no wife
present and still lower ($35,154) for a female head of household with no husband
present).
188. In my examples, the wife earns less than the husband. Statistics bear
out that this is the more common gender scenario (71% of husbands earn more than
their wives in dual-earner couples). Wives Who Earn More Than Their Husbands,
1987–2014, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/wives-earnmore.htm (last updated Apr. 6, 2016). However, the percentage of working wives
who earn more than their husbands in the United States has steadily increased in the
past 25 years, and as of 2013 an estimated 38% of wives out-earned their husbands
(this statistic reflects both one-earner households in which the wives were the worker
and dual-earner household). Id.
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They benefit from the child tax credit, but their federal income tax
liability on a joint return would be $1,866.
If for whatever reason this couple chose to file two individual returns
each using the married filing separately status, with the wife claiming the
two children, the husband would have a liability of $4,028 and the wife
would receive a refund of $1,804 (attributable to the child tax credit). As a
unit, their liability is $2,224, which is $358 higher than their joint liability
would have been. This is one illustration of how the current system favors
joint filers over married filing separately.
Imagine, however, if this proposal applied in this scenario and the
taxpayers chose (for whatever reason) to file as married filing separately.
Perhaps they are estranged but not yet legally separated. Perhaps they do not
trust one another. Perhaps they have chosen to keep finances separate. Under
the proposal, each taxpayer would be allowed one-half the amount of the
EITC allowed to an unmarried taxpayer at the same income level. Assuming
the wife claims both children on her return, the husband’s liability would be
the same as under the current rules: $4,028. He is not penalized, but he does
not benefit individually. This is because an unmarried taxpayer earning
$40,000 with no qualifying children has surpassed the EITC’s income phaseout threshold. On the other hand, the wife’s refund amount would be higher
now, because she would be entitled to an EITC of $2,499 (one-half the
amount that is allowed to an unmarried taxpayer with $20,000 of earned
income and two qualifying children). Her total refund (including the child
tax credit, which is the same amount as if she had filed separately) would be
$4,303.
As an economic unit they are better off filing separately than
jointly—when his liability is subtracted from her refund, they net a refund of
$275. Contrast this to the $1,866 they would have owed on a joint return:
they are better off by $2,138 for having decided to file separately.
Note, however, that unmarried cohabiting parents would fare better
still (under both the current Code and this proposal). If both taxpayers filed
as single and the mother claimed the children, they would receive an
aggregate refund of $2,774.189 In this scenario, as is not at all uncommon, the
189. The father would have a liability of $4,028 and the mother would
receive the child tax credit plus an EITC of $4,998, resulting in a refund to her of
$6,802. Note that neither can file as head of household because the father is not
claiming a dependent. At her income level, it would be unlikely (though not
impossible, depending on their expenses) that the wife can show that she is
furnishing more than half the cost of the household shared by the four of them. The
mother claiming both children is the most favorable permutation for an unmarried
couple, though they have two other filing options: the father could file as head of
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unmarried taxpayers fare better than the married taxpayers. This proposal
would reduce the dollar amount by which this is true, but it does not
eliminate the disparity or fully remove the incentive for noncompliance.
b. Household Income at the Median: Married Couple Earns $76,500
At this median married couple household income level, imagine a
husband with an adjusted gross income of $56,500 and a wife with adjusted
gross income of $20,000. They have two minor children in their home. As
joint filers, they would not be entitled to any EITC because their $60,000
total income exceeds the married filing jointly phase-out for the credit. They
do benefit from the child tax credit, but their federal income tax liability on a
joint return would be $4,341.
If the couple in this scenario chose to file two individual returns each
using the married filing separately status, with the wife claiming the two
children, the husband would have a liability of $7,450 and the wife would
again receive a refund of $1,804 (attributable to the child tax credit; recall
that her income does not change throughout these illustrations). As a unit,
their liability is $5,646, which is $1,305 higher than their joint liability would
have been. Again, this illustrates how the current system favors joint filers
over married filing separately.
If this proposal applied to the couple and the wife claimed both
children on her return, the husband’s liability would be the same as under the
current rules: $7,450. His wife’s refund amount would be the same as in the
last scenario because her income did not change: she would be allowed an
EITC of $2,499 (one-half the amount that is allowed to an unmarried
taxpayer with $20,000 of earned income and two qualifying children), and
her total refund would be $4,303.
As was true in the lower-income example, under this proposal the
couple as an economic unit is better off filing separately than jointly—when
her refund is subtracted from his liability, they owe $3,147 instead of the
$4,341 they would have owed on a joint return. Thus, it is worth $1,194 for
them to choose to file separately. At this higher joint income level, the
benefit realized from filing separately is not as great. This is true because
household and claim both children (while the mother files as single) or the father
could file as head of household and claim one child, while the mother files as single
and claims the other. The latter scenario produces an aggregate refund of $1,555,
which is considerably more favorable than the outcome for the married couple filing
separately in my proposal. In each of the three unmarried permutations, the
taxpayers collectively owe less/receive a higher refund than if they were married
filing jointly.
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they have lost the advantage of income splitting afforded to joint filers. But
the ability for the wife to claim EITC outweighs the income splitting in this
scenario.
It is helpful to think of the couple as an economic unit when
considering the fiscal impact of this proposal. But it is also important to
remember that the couple may not be acting as an economic unit: if they are
separated or estranged, the wife would benefit greatly from the EITC as she
makes the transition from marriage to single parent household.
As in the lower-income illustration and as is generally true,
unmarried cohabiting parents at this income level would still have a better
outcome than the married couple filing separately in my proposal. No matter
how they choose to allocate the children, the unmarried parents would
collectively owe less than a married couple filing jointly; if the mother
claims both children, they will collectively owe thousands of dollars less
than the married couple filing separately under my proposal.190
c.
Earns $90,000

Household Income Above the Median: Married Couple

To illustrate the higher-income scenario, imagine that the husband
earns income of $70,000 while the wife earns income of $20,000. At this
income level, the incentives now shift if the married couple is acting as an
economic unit because the income splitting becomes more significant. With a
combined income of $90,000, the couple would owe $6,366 on a joint return.
If they filed separate returns under the current law, they would collectively
owe $9,021, a far worse outcome.
Under my proposal, the wife filing separately would again receive
$2,499 in EITC, just as in the first two examples. However, even under my
proposal the couple would now collectively owe more ($6,522) by filing
separately than by filing jointly.
Presumably, spouses who live together and act in their economic
interests would not make this choice. But as in the other two illustrations, the
benefit to the wife is significant if the couple is parting ways, because she
can use that EITC in establishing her new household.

190. The father filing as single would have a liability of $7,450, while the
mother claiming both children would receive a refund of $6,802; together they
would have an aggregate liability of $648. Contrast this with the married couple
filing separately under my proposal, who at these same income levels collectively
would have a liability of $3,147.
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As with the other scenarios, we see again that a similarly situated
unmarried couple would fare better financially than a married couple filing
jointly or separately: no matter how they choose to allocate the two children,
they will owe less collectively than a married couple filing jointly or a
married couple filing separately under my proposal.
2. Pros of this Proposal
This proposal offers a number of advantages that the second
proposal did not offer. First, there is greater simplicity under this proposal.
Fewer existing provisions in the Code would change because the marital
determination provisions are left intact. Unlike the second proposal, it would
not create a new class of issues for potential audit.
The proposal also narrows the level of disparity between unmarried
cohabitating parents and married couples, though a disparity generally would
continue at all income levels. Still, the proposal would at least decrease the
magnitude of the incentive for married taxpayers to misrepresent filing
statuses and engage in noncompliance because taxpayers would be entitled to
at least some amount of EITC.
Importantly, this proposal could motivate the spouse with less
earning power to work. This is a worthwhile policy to consider for a number
of reasons. Currently, married women whose husbands work face a number
of economic and tax disincentives to work.191 This proposal certainly would
not erase all of those disincentives, but it could provide at least a small
incentive to work. Specific to the EITC, one study found that expansions to
the credit from the years 1984 to 1996 “reduced total family labor supply of
married couples. In all cases, we find a decline in labor force participation by
married women that more than offsets any rise in participation by their
spouses.”192
Why does it matter whether the spouse with less earning power
chooses to work? Women who do not participate in the workforce are at risk

191. For an article describing these in detail, see Margaret Ryznar, To
Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921 (2009).
192. Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor
Market Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J.
PUB. ECON. 1931 (2004) (“these findings imply that the EITC is effectively
subsidizing married mothers to stay home.”).
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if their marriage fails or their spouse dies.193 Another angle to consider: a
stated policy rationale of the EITC is that it offsets the regressive nature of
payroll taxes for low-income workers. For married women with higherearning husbands (or the gender opposite—married men with higher-earning
wives), the payroll tax is especially regressive, because they will earn social
security benefits based upon their spouse’s earnings.194 This regressivity can
be offset by allowing a wife who earns $20,000 to claim the EITC on a
married filing separate return even if the household income exceeds joint
income tax phase-out amounts.
Recall the two objectives stated in the legislative history to the EITC
as originally enacted in 1975: (1) “as a way of decreasing work
disincentives” for persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the
regressive nature of social security taxes.195 The logic of these same
objectives applies today for the lower-earning spouse.
Empowering the spouse with less earning potential might incentivize some
work over none. This potential upside to the proposal should not be
overlooked.
3. Cons of This Proposal
There are at least three drawbacks to this proposal: 1) cost, 2)
blurring of the EITC’s purpose of reducing household poverty, and 3) the
reduced dollar amount available to estranged spouses in separate households.
This Section will address these in turn.
As to cost, this third proposal would be more expensive than
proposal number two because suddenly many married parents living together
would reevaluate their tax return and discover that they would be better off
filing separate returns. And unlike the second proposal, there is no reduction
in benefits to unmarried cohabitating parents to serve as a cost offset. Of
course, my proposal to allow one-half the EITC allowed to an unmarried
person at the same income level is just an arbitrary figure, and I used a fixed
percentage for simplicity’s sake. Congress could enlist economists to
determine a more appropriate amount (or percentage) of EITC allowable to
193. JOAN WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN
AND CLASS MATTER 25 (2010) (providing statistics on how even short periods out of
the work force can impact long-term earning potential).
194. Sita Nataraj Slavov, Social Security's War On Working Wives, REAL
CLEAR MARKETS (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/10
/17/social_securitys_war_on_working_wives_99940.html (arguing that for these
wives “the payroll tax discourages work just like an income tax”).
195. JCT, 1969 ACT, supra note 126, at 222.
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married taxpayers filing separately. It could choose to phase out the income
level faster, or allow amounts on a scale that does not track the unmarried
curve at all. In my view, any amount of EITC allowed to married taxpayers
filing separately is better than nothing—which is what these filers get now.
The second drawback is that this proposal moves away from the EITC as an
anti-poverty program. First, it would result in a significant number of
spouses receiving EITC despite living in a household whose income exceeds
what the current system defines as needing a boost out of poverty. Note,
though, that as household income increases and the disparity between the
two spouse’s income increases, the tax liability will look like the third
illustration: for spouses who live together, the loss of income splitting from
filing jointly hurts them far more than any EITC benefit from filing
separately would help them.
In addition, this proposal does not address what I describe as a
current shortcoming of the EITC as an anti-poverty program—the fact that
two unmarried cohabitating parents receive a more generous household EITC
than Congress intended. As described throughout both proposals, there are
many examples of unmarried cohabitating households far above the poverty
line that currently benefit from the EITC because the lower-income parent
happens to be eligible for the credit.
The third shortcoming of this proposal is that it does not do enough
to help the group with which I am most concerned, which is low-income
spouses who separate and have no choice but to file separately, at a time
when they could benefit greatly from receiving the credit. Under this third
proposal, such a spouse would only receive half as much EITC as he or she
would receive under the second proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Married couples overwhelmingly choose to file joint returns.196
Married couples acting as partners and behaving as rational economic actors
will typically file jointly for the sake of simplicity and perhaps for the
benefits of income splitting. However, many married individuals do not face
such rosy circumstances: they are in abusive relationships, they have been
abandoned, or they cannot trust their spouse. A married taxpayer who elects
196. For tax year 2012, the Service received 53,718,396 returns of married
persons filing jointly. For the same year, it received 2,663,017 returns of married
persons filing separately. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 27, at 77 tbl.1.6.
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to file separately does not make this decision lightly. If the individual is lowincome, he or she faces an additional layer of vulnerability. Denying these
separate filers credits that would otherwise be allowed is needlessly punitive
and only compounds a difficult economic situation. In cases in which
taxpayers are savvy enough to understand how the filing statuses work, the
current rules also incentivize noncompliance because unmarried taxpayers
are not subject to the same restrictive rules.
There are not clear policy reasons for denying so many benefits to
separate married filers without regard to household income or other
circumstances. Moreover, there is a curious lack of consistency among how
various credits are treated when claimed by separate married filers, and a
corresponding lack of legislative history explaining these differences. The
current Code incents filing status noncompliance because of the disparate
ways in which taxpayers are treated. The inequities resulting from these
inconsistencies are further exacerbated by the limitations on amending filing
status. One wonders if Congress has given coherent thought to how separate
married filers should be treated, as it seems provisions have been enacted
over time without much regard to the challenges faced by this filing status.
With that said, the exception provided for by the Treasury regulations in the
newest refundable credit—the premium tax credit—and the subsequent
administrative guidance provide a precedent for creating exceptions, at least
for the most sympathetic circumstances. The latitude provided by the
premium tax credit exception is a small but positive step in the right direction
towards recognizing the range of valid and sympathetic reasons why a
married taxpayer might file a separate return.
I have set forth three proposals that remove the punitive barriers
faced by these taxpayers. Proposal one is quite narrow and would not have
broad application. Proposals two and three address not just the specific
problems of separate filers, but also broader structural inequities in the U.S.
tax system.
There are many other, less ambitious ideas to consider that might
achieve relief for many filers who currently must file separately. For
example, a simple approach would be for Congress to amend and liberalize
the definition of “considered as married” in section 7703: if the measuring
period were less than six months, it would be far less punitive to those
taxpayers in marital transition. Likewise, Congress could remove section
7703(b)(1)’s requirement that the taxpayer maintain a household for a
dependent child. This would correct the bizarre situation under current law in
which a taxpayer who is estranged but cannot afford a divorce, or who
cannot locate his or her spouse, is nonetheless required to file a married
filing separate return for the rest of his or her life.
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In sum, the Code’s current knee-jerk approach—a flat out denial of
certain credits to separate filers—is overly simplistic and punitive. Congress
should revisit it in some fashion.
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